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Figure 1: Northwestern Canada: The Inside Passage
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, following the breakdown of negotiations to revise the
Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty (Pacific Salmon Treaty),'
1. Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11,091 (entered into
force Mar. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Pacific Salmon Treaty]. For the history of this treaty, see Gordon R.
Munro & Robert L. Stokes, The Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty, in CANADIAN OCEANS
POLICY: NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 17, 19-26 (Donald McRae & Gordon
Munro eds., 1989).
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1Countermeasures in the Salmon Dispute
Canada imposed a fee of $1500 Canadian on all U.S. commercial fishing
boats transiting Canada's Inside Passage between Washington and southeast
Alaska.2 The attempted revisions to the Treaty concerned an effort by the
parties to create a meaningful conservation regime that would allot to all
parties an equitable catch of Pacific salmon, while allowing many endangered
salmon stocks the chance to recover from overfishing. The Inside Passage
transit fee lasted eighteen days during which roughly three hundred U.S. boats
were made to pay the fee.3
The transit fee violated many provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).4 In particular, the fee violated the right
of innocent passage afforded to vessels travelling through waterways like the
Canadian Inside Passage. In addition, the fee violated transit guarantees under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' However,
international law is not composed only of treaty law but also includes
uncodified international norms and customs - customary international law.
This customary international law is often forged in the crucible of
international disputes. How states behave and what behavior is considered
acceptable by other members of the international community create much of
the corpus of customary international law. This Article's examination of the
international dispute over the Inside Passage fee will cast light on the
emerging customary international law doctrine of lawful, nonforcible
countermeasures. Countermeasures may serve to legitimate a state's otherwise
illegal breach of international law.6 However, unlike common law
justification, international law justification has not been codified in any
international treaty or convention. Rather, it is an emerging and debated norm
of customary international law. Hence, examinations of international disputes
in which countermeasures are used can illuminate the doctrine of
countermeasures. Every resort to a countermeasure within a dispute helps to
define the boundaries of that doctrine.
This Article will argue that the Canadian Inside Passage transit fee can
be characterized as a countermeasure. When so characterized, the transit fee
should not be considered illegal under international law, even though the
imposition of such a fee violated many of Canada's treaty obligations. In
2. Licence Fee Announced for U.S. Vessels, CANADA DEP'T OF FISHERIES & OCEANS, NEWS
RELEASE/CoMmuNIQut NE-HQ-94-5QE, June 9, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Licence Fee] ($1500 Canadian
equals approximately U.S. $1100).
3. Failure to comply "could result in a fine, confiscation of vessel and or [fishing] gear under the
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act." Notice to All United States Commercial Fishing Vessel Owners,
CANADA DEP'T OF FISHERIES & OCEANS, June 9, 1994, at I. The fines could have been as high as
$50,000 to $75,000 Canadian. Dave Birkland et al., Fishermen Fume at Toll of Salmon Feud with Canada,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 10, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Fishermnen Fume].
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 1.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOSI.
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
6. See ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERMEASURES 119-20 (1984) ("In theory a countermeasure is a temporary dispensation from an
international obligation bestowed upon a subject of law by the international legal order for a coercive
purpose as a reaction to an internationally wrongful act."); cf. OMER YousiF ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF
NoN-FORCIBLE COuNTER-MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1988) (describing legitimacy of
countermeasures as concept in international law).
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addition, because the Inside Passage fee is a concrete example of a
countermeasure, an examination of the fee can help illuminate this emerging
doctrine of customary international law.
The Pacific salmon dispute involves competing claims and conservation
plans for the salmon in the region. This Article will primarily explore the
actions of the parties involved in one of the more serious manifestations of
this ongoing dispute, the Canadian Inside Passage transit fee. The Article will
not examine the complex questions surrounding the merits of the parties'
underlying claims, namely, who is entitled to the disputed salmon; rather, the
Article will focus on the recent countermeasures employed by the two parties.
In addition, this Article will focus on the parties' individual actions and not
on the many complex negotiations involved in this dispute. Part II of this
Article will describe the history of the dispute, recent developments, and the
parties' individual perspectives. Part III will examine the legality of the fee
under international treaty law and under the emerging doctrine of
countermeasures.
II. THE INCIDENT
A. The Pacific Salmon Industry
Historically, one of the purposes of the state is to assert control over land
and resources. Today, the modern state also seeks to control large sections of
the sea along its coast. However, when compared to its ability to control terra
firma, the state's ability to control the sea is tenuous. While admitting that
ultimate control of the oceans is impossible, states nonetheless seek to control
their ocean resources, particularly their fisheries. Like the ocean itself,
however, fisheries have proven difficult to control because the state cannot
stop this wild resource from crossing international borders.
The inability of states strictly to control the ocean, the fishing industry,
and the fish themselves often leads to conflict between states. This conflict is
exacerbated by technology that allows countries increasingly to exploit more
of the ocean and catch more of the fish. As a result, the world's fishing stocks
have been declining at an alarming rate, forcing countries to compete for an
ever dwindling stock of fish.7 Disputes over ocean resources do not just
confine themselves to an exchange of diplomatic notes, but have on occasion
led to aggressive naval actions, such as in the "Cod Wars" between Iceland
and Britain. The Pacific salmon dispute is another dispute that has escalated
beyond diplomatic notes.
This dispute has not drawn much of the world's attention; attention has
instead focused on Canada's more colorful actions in the Atlantic directed
against the European Union. Although short lived, Canada's dispute with the
European Union included incidents of Canadian patrol vessels firing across
7. Craig Turner, World Report, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at 3. Throughout the world fisheries
are in serious decline. From 1989 to 1994, marine catches worldwide declined 5%. Id.
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boat bows, seizing ships, and cutting fishing nets of Spanish boats.' Although
the dispute in the Pacific did not lead to such dramatic incidents, the Pacific
salmon industry also deserves attention, having earned $142 million for British
Columbia and $390 million for Alaska in 1993, the year preceding the recent
dispute.9 Hence, this protracted conflict is not only harmful to U.S.-Canadian
relations, but could also have a significant effect on both regions' long term
economies. If the dispute is not resolved soon, the Pacific salmon industry
could share the tragic fate of the Atlantic coast fisheries.
The underlying cause of the dispute can be explained by examining the
migratory habits of the Pacific salmon. The Pacific salmon involved in this
dispute are born in rivers in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, British' Columbia,
the Yukon Territory, and southeast Alaska. The salmon, an anadromous 0
species, then migrate downriver to the ocean where they mature, before
returning to their birth rivers to spawn and die." The fishers usually catch
the salmon when the salmon return to their spawning grounds between June
and September, the salmon fishing season."
North American Pacific salmon return to their rivers from the ocean by
following a circuitous route. After striking the coast, the salmon swim along
the coast until they reach their birth river. Most often this route results in the
salmon striking the coast to the north of their birth river, often in Alaskan
waters. 3 Salmon born in an Oregon river could return to that river from the
high seas by swimming down the coast of southeast Alaska, British Columbia,
and Washington before reaching their birth river in Oregon. The Alaskan
fishers thus get the first chance to catch those salmon.14 This migratory
pattern makes it impossible for fishers to know the "nationality" of the salmon
8. Tobin Should Stand Finn on Conservation of B.C. Salmon, FIN. POST, July 5, 1995, at 8
[hereinafter Tobin Should Stand Firm]. Canada's actions in the Atlantic, which imply that coastal states
should have control beyond the 200 mile exclusive economic zone to ensure the conservation of fisheries
within that zone, deserve further study. However, such a discussion exceeds the scope of this Article.
9. Charles Truehart, American or Canadian? Whose Salnon Is It, Anyway?, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
1994, at A29.
10. Anadromous species of fish are born in freshwater rivers but migrate to the sea, only to return
to their birth river to spawn.
11. There are many different species of Pacific salmon with many different names for the same
species (e.g., chinook is also known as king salmon because of its large size). While occasionally the
Pacific salmon dispute between the United States and Canada centers on one specific species, I will not
differentiate among them in this Article because the basic issues - namely, equitable allocation and
conservation - are the same regardless of the species in dispute.
12. Truehart, supra note 9, at A29. However, the fishers catch the salmon after the salmon have
been affected by the freshwater of their spawning rivers. The fresh water physically changes the salmon
while the rough passage upriver through rapids damages their bodies.
13. In recent years, salmon that ordinarily would not have returned to British Columbia via Alaska
have been forced further North into Alaskan waters by the warm waters of "El Nifio." Bill Richards, As
Salmon Catch Falls, U.S. and Canada Slide into a Heated Dispute, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1994, at Al.
This description obviously does not apply to the large numbers of salmon caught in Alaska's other major
salmon producing regions, such as Bristol Bay, Kodiak, Kenai Peninsula, and along the Alaska Peninsula.
14. Salmon migration patterns are considerably more complicated than the description above would
suggest. For example, it is primarily Northern British Columbia rivers, mainly the Stikine and Taku
Rivers, that suffer most from Alaskan salmon fisheries. Parzival Copes, Canadian Fisheries Management
Policy: International Dimensions, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY: NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEW
LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 1, at 3, 12.
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they catch."t U.S. fishers in Alaskan waters can therefore catch "Canadian"
salmon before Canadian spawned salmon can return to Canadian rivers, while
Canadian fishers can catch "Washington" salmon before Washington spawned
salmon can return to their spawning rivers. 6 Alaska is in a unique position
in that the amount of its annual salmon catch can significantly affect the
salmon returning to all the other parties' rivers, while those other parties
cannot similarly affect Alaska's salmon catch.' 7 It is crucial that all of the
coastal parties, particularly Alaska, fully cooperate with any conservation and
catch allocation plan for the region.
B. The Pacific Salmon Dispute
The migratory nature of Pacific salmon has historically involved the
United States in many international disputes. On occasion, those disputes have
even involved countries from the other side of the Pacific Ocean. 8 Closer to
home, Pacific salmon have been the subject of U.S.-Canadian disputes since
the beginning of this century. 9 The current salmon dispute between the
United States and Canada dates from the 1950s when Canada realized that
Alaskan fishers were harvesting salmon that were heading for Canadian
rivers. 20 Fourteen years of bilateral negotiations resulted in the 1985 Pacific
Salmon Treaty,2' which attempted to balance the fishing agendas of four
U.S. states, one Canadian province, one Canadian territory, and twenty-four
15. Of course, fishers will know the nationality of salmon caught with tags that indicate their place
of origin. It is these tags that help marine biologists establish the migratory patterns of the fish and that
also provide data to calculate the amount of "Canadian" salmon caught by U.S. fishermen.
16. Neal Hall, Alaska's Chinook Stand Means Ill Windfor B.C. Fishers, VANCOUVER SUN, July 4,
1995, at A3. British Columbia Fisheries Minister Dave Zirnhelt said of the Alaska salmon fishery, "They
have a stranglehold on [British Columbia's] stocks." Id.
17. Eighty-five percent of all salmon harvested from the Pacific coast are caught in Alaskan waters.
However, if the other parties' rivers fail to produce young salmon, then eventually Alaska will suffer. In
that way, the other parties can have some impact on Alaska's southeast salmon harvests. Rob Tucker, Rift
Hurts Treaty Chances: Salmon Prospects Dim, Canadian Says, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWs, Nov. 5, 1994,
at D2.
18. The most notable instance is the salmon fishing dispute between the United States and Japan in
the 1930s that resulted in the Truman Fisheries Proclamation of 1945. See WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 4-9 (1994).
19. Munro & Stokes, supra note 1, at 20. The Fraser River salmon stocks were the focus of U.S.-
Canadian negotiations that led to the Bryce-Root Treaty of 1908. However, that treaty did not solve the
problem, and it was not until 1930 that the Fraser River salmon stocks were properly dealt with by a
treaty, formally known as the Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye
Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River System. Id. at 20-21; see also ELLEN HEY, THE REGIME FOR THE
EXPLOITATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE FISHERIES RESOURCES 263 (1989) (stating that treaty, as
amended, was limited to cooperation between Canada and United States with respect to salmon from
Fraser River).
20. R. M. LOGAN, CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE THIRD LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
51(1974).
21. Because salmon spend a great deal of their lives on the high seas, it has also been necessary to
create a high seas conservation regime for salmon. This resulted in, most recently, the 1992 North
Pacific Salmon Treaty. For more on that treaty, see Shannon C. Swanstrom, The Trend Towards Eco-
System Management in the North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
225 (1995); Kelly R. Bryan, Note, Swimming Upstream: Trying to Enforce the 1992 North Pacific Salmon
Treaty, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 241 (1995). For the history of regulation of high seas salmon fisheries,
see HEY, supra note 19, at 271-74; LOGAN, supra note 20, at 45-47.
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American Indian tribes.' As with the current dispute, it was the U.S.
parties' divergent and conflicting agendas that almost made the Treaty
impossible to negotiate.'
Alaska was concerned that its salmon catch would be reduced under a
Pacific salmon treaty. Alaska also feared that a treaty, by facilitating
successful claims by northwest American Indian tribes, would lead to further
catch reductions.24 Furthermore, Alaska and Canada wanted the spawning
river states to their south to manage their rivers better so as to allow for
replenishment of the salmon stocks, while the northwestern United States and
Canada wanted all northward fishing zones to exercise restraint and allow
more fish to reach their rivers and their fishing zones.
25
A law suit, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation
v. Baldrige,26 which was brought in 1985 by American Indians seeking
enforcement of treaties from the 1850s, finally resolved the negotiations after
fourteen years of deadlock. That case led to a settlement that remains under
judicial supervision to this day. As part of the settlement, Alaska agreed to
cooperate in "ratification and effective implementation of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty . . . [and t]o provide for a fair interstate domestic allocation of chinook
salmon resources."27 In return, the native tribes agreed that, for the duration
of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, they would not initiate any new law suits
seeking to enjoin Alaska from catching fish due to the tribes under historic
28treaties.
The Pacific Salmon Treaty's purpose is to ensure conservation and equity
of catch. 29 However, due to fluctuations in salmon numbers, the Treaty was
22. Joy A. Yanagida, The Pacific Salmon Treaty, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 577, 577 (1987).
23. See generally Ted L. McDorman, The West Coast Salmon Dispute: A Canadian View of the
Breakdown of the 1985 Treaty and the Transit License Measure, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 477
(1995) (articulating Canadian perspective on salmon dispute).
24. Munro & Stokes, supra note 1, at 27-28. Alaska's reasoning was as follows: If there was a
Pacific Salmon Treaty that set allocations all along the West Coast, then Pacific Northwest native tribes'
salmon rights, as guaranteed under historic treaties, could realistically be included in the total salmon
allocations through suit in federal court. If there was no treaty, then any reduction in Alaska's catch made
to accommodate native salmon rights would not necessarily accrue to the benefit of the native tribes of the
Pacific Northwest as there would be no guarantee that the Canadians would not catch those salmon not
previously caught by the Alaskans. Therefore, it was in Alaska's interest to oppose the Treaty so long as
Alaska was afraid that Pacific Northwest native tribes would sue for their share of Alaska's salmon. Id.
25. Id.
26. 605 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Wash. 1985) [hereinafter Baldrige 1]. This opinion is essentially the
stipulation settlement between the parties, which included the U.S. federal government and the states of
Alaska, Oregon, and Washington. The suit sought to enforce certain fishing rights secured by treaties (i.e.,
the Stevens and Palmer Treaties dating from the 1850s) entered into between the United States and-certain
Indian tribes.
27. Id. at 834.
28. Id. at 835. This agreement by native tribes not to sue Alaska opened the way for Alaska to allow
ratification of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, which had been opposed and effectively blocked by Senator
Stevens of Alaska. For a discussion of Alaska's ratification of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, see Munro &
Stokes, supra note I.
29. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note I, art. III, para. 1. The relevant portions of the Treaty are:
With respect to stocks subject to this Treaty, each Party shall conduct its fisheries and its
salmon enhancement programs so as to:
(a) prevent over fishing and provide for optimum production; and
(b) provide for each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon
originating in its waters.
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designed to be periodically revised.3" The Treaty provides that those
revisions are to be recommended by the Pacific Salmon Commission, which
was created by the Treaty. The Commission is composed of a U.S. section
and a Canadian section.3 ' The approval of both sections is required to make
a decision or a recommendation on issues relating to Pacific salmon.3 2
However, the U.S. section's decisions on allocations of salmon between
Alaska and the Pacific Northwest are governed by the stipulation and
settlement of the 1985 law suit, which requires that allocations can be made
only by unanimous consent of all the members of the U.S. section.
Furthermore, the stipulation mandates that Alaska be a voting member of the
U.S. section.33 Thus, Alaska has a veto over the Pacific Salmon
Commission's Pacific salmon allocations. This, in turn, is the source of
Alaska's veto power in the recent revision and renegotiation of the Treaty.
These recent renegotiations and revisions to the Treaty have been
especially difficult because salmon stocks in both British Columbia and the
Northwest have decreased since 1985. The decline is due primarily to
increased river pollution and the construction of hydroelectric dams in salmon
spawning rivers. Stocks have become so depleted that certain species of
salmon may be put on the endangered species list.34 Until recently, the
Canadians asserted that their conservation plans had resulted in increasing the
numbers of salmon. However, a recent report has cast doubt on the success
of Canada's conservation of salmon habitats.35 As if to underscore this
report, Canada's 1995 salmon run was considerably smaller than expected.36
Like the 1985 treaty negotiations, the current negotiations have not been
easy. Once again, there are too many different constituencies involved.37
Native tribes in both the United States and Canada seek to protect tribal
privileges from any encroachment by a new treaty. On the U.S. side, there
are large differences in the agenda between the Alaskan and northwest fishers.
For example, Alaskan fishers claim that they should not have to reduce their
30. Yanagida, supra note 22, at 578.
31. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 1.
32. Id. art. II, para. 6.
33. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 898 F. Supp. 1477, 1482
(W.D. Wash. 1995) [hereinafter Baldrige 11] (describing article IV-A of stipulation and settlement).
34. Scott Sonner, Salmon Treaty on Hold, Alaska Veto Power a Sticking Point, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, July 23, 1994, at Cl.
35. Joel Connelly, Canada Backs Off, Faces its Own Fish Crisis, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 14,
1995, at A6. Canada had assumed that because its rivers generally were not dammed they were in better
condition than those of Oregon and Washington. However, a recent report by a former Canadian fisheries
minister, John Fraser, has shown the appalling conditions of the Canadian salmon habitat. See id.
36. See Mike Crawley, Minister Seeks Aidfor Fishers Hurt by Salnon Ban, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug.
14, 1995, at A3. For example, only one-third of the expected numbers of British Columbia's lucrative
sockeye salmon returned in 1995. It is expected that the 1996 salmon run will be as bad as or worse than
the 1995 salmon run. See Scott Simpson, West Coast Salmon Fleet Faces Tough Tmes as Industry
Downsizes, OTTAWA CIzEN, Feb. 5, 1996, at A3.
37. The Canadians believe that one of the main barriers to a new treaty is that the various fishing
interests in the United States cannot agree among themselves on a common response to the Canadians'
treaty grievances and demands. See Tobin Announces Advisory Panel On Pacific Salmon, DEP'T OF
STATE, OES PRESS GUIDANCE, June 9, 1994, at 1. There are even differences between the agendas of
Washington and Idaho. Salmon spawned in Idaho may be protected under Idaho river regulations only to
be killed downstream in Washington's river developments.
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catch because northwest and Canadian rivers are failing to produce salmon,
while Alaskan rivers have safely increased their salmon, catch numbers. 8
Alaskans assert that their salmon harvest has increased despite the fact that
Alaskan fishermen have had to contend with strict conservation measures,
Native Alaskan fishing quotas and rights, a significant sport fishing
constituency, 39 and the sharing of commercial salmon fishing with fishers
from the Northwest.4"
The U.S. government has its own unique position with regard to the
Pacific salmon dispute. The salmon dispute is not the only issue between the
United States and Canada. Canada is the United States' number one trading
partner and a close ally. Thus, the U.S. government is forced to handle this
dispute within the broader picture of its relations with Canada. Yet, the U.S.
government, particularly the executive branch, cannot ignore the individual
views of U.S. constituencies. These constituencies' positions have become
even more important to the Democrat controlled executive since the 1994
November elections when the Republicans took control of Congress and its
key committees.41
Meanwhile, the northwest fishers claim that they always receive the short
end of the stick. They attribute part of the decline in northwest salmon
numbers to the fact that many of their fish are caught by Alaskan or British
Columbian fishers before they get to northwest waters .42 Northwest fishers
also complain that they have to deal with Canadian retaliation when the
salmon dispute heats up. It is primarily the fishers from the Northwest who
must travel through the Canadian Inside Passage to get to Alaska, and it is
their fish that can be caught by the Canadians in retaliation for alleged
Alaskan violations of the Treaty. 3
The Canadian perspective on this dispute is colored by their experience
with the collapse of the Canadian Atlantic fishing industry. By 1992, the once
major cod fishery was so depleted that Canada was forced to declare fishing
38. An example of Alaskan fishermen's attitude to the dispute is well set out in a letter to- the San
Francisco Examiner by Frank Rue, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish and Game. See Letters to
the Editor, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 13, 1995, at A18.
39. Currently, sport fishermen in Alaska are allocated 2% of the statewide catch allowance.
Interestingly, even as Alaska is embroiled in litigation and mediation with Canada, other U.S. states, and
Native groups, the sport fishing constituency in Alaska is seeking to increase the sport allotment to 5%
of the salmon catch. This increase would have raised this year's sport fishermen salmon allotment to 10
million. See Alaskans Fight Over Own Salmon, MORNING NEWS TRM. (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 16, 1995,
at B4.
40. In fact, the sharing of Alaskan salmon with Northwest fishermen will possibly be subject to
negotiation. Senator Stevens, an Alaskan Republican, said, "If we go back to the treaty table, I'm going
to ensure we have a residency clause." Southeast Toll Season Opens; Canada Unhappy With Harvest
Quotas, AP Political Service, July 3, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database [hereinafter
Southeast Toll Season]. One estimate of the impact of the Washington and Oregon fishermen on the
Southeast Alaska salmon fishery states concluded that there are over 1000 Washington and Oregon boats
participating in the catch of Southeast Alaska salmon. Hall, supra note 16, at A3'
41. See Chris Wood, The West Coast War, MACLEAN'S, July 17, 1995, at 12. Senator Stevens chairs
the Senate Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries, while Alaska's one congressman is chairman of the
House Committee on Resources. See id.
42. See Ron Judd, For Frustrated Canada, Salmon Fee a Last Resort; U.S. Raking in Big Harvest
of B.C. Fish, SEATTLE TIMES, June 19, 1994, at Al.
43. See id. One Seattle journalist remarked: "It's like a guy has a bad day at work, goes home, yells
at his wife, she screams at the kid, so the kid goes outside and kicks the cat. We're the cat." Id.
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moratoriums that have wreaked havoc on the traditional fishing communities
of the maritime provinces.' Ottawa has injected large quantities of economic
aid to help the region by sending billions of Canadian dollars.' s Canada is
determined to protect its Pacific coast fisheries from the fate of the Atlantic
fisheries.
Even before the recent alarming decline in Pacific salmon stocks, Canada
had been concerned that the United States was catching too many salmon of
Canadian origin. Canada claims that its catch of U.S. salmon fell by 40% in
the three years preceding the imposition of the fee, while the United States'
catch of Canadian salmon increased by 50% during that same period.46
According to Canada, this resulted in U.S. fishermen taking six million more
salmon in 1993 than the United States had a right to under the most recent
salmon treaty.47 The Canadians also claimed that the United States intended
to take an additional two million fish in 1994. Canada's Minister for Fisheries
and Oceans at the time of the transit fee, Brian Tobin, said that "[w]e are not
going to give free passage to a nation that has indicated its intention to take
two million more fish this year [1994] than last year, thus raising the inequity
from six to eight million."41
The Canadians erroneously claimed that it was unfair that their recently
recovered salmon stocks should suffer just because of the failure of northwest
conservation measures.49 The Canadian Fisheries Minister said that
"Canadians have protected their salmon resource and have made substantial
investments to increase abundance. U.S. authorities have made other choices
and the result has been steady declines of coho and chinook returning to
Washington and Oregon."S° The Canadians feared that this U.S. conservation
failure would increase the inequities already present in the Pacific salmon
catch allocations. Thus, by early 1994, the Canadians perceived that they were
facing a crisis on the Pacific coast that could parallel their Atlantic fisheries
disaster.
44. See Turner, supra note 7, at 3. One in four people in Newfoundland is currently unemployed
as a result of the decline of the traditional Atlantic fisheries.
45. See Crawley, supra note 36, at A3.
46. See Anne Swardson, Canada Sets Stiff Fee for Salmon Boats, WASH. POST, June 16, 1994, at
A42.
47. See Canada and U.S. to Resume Stalled Salmon Talks, available in WESTLAW, Int. News
Library, Reutr. File. This salmon was estimated to be worth roughly $50 million.
48. Licence Fee, supra note 2, at 1. Minister Tobin had been the driving force behind Canada's
active, and at times aggressive, fisheries policy. In January 1996, when Tobin resigned to become Premier
of Newfoundland, he was replaced by Fred Mifflin, a retired admiral in the Canadian Navy. Averting
Salmon War, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 13, 1996, at C6. For a Canadian view of the Pacific Salmon
Treaty (and for a Canadian view of the legality of the transit fee), see McDorman, supra note 23.
49. According to a recent Canadian government report, the Canadians were operating under a
misconception regarding Canada's conservation record. In fact, the Canadian salmon spawning habitat had
suffered extensive environmental damage in recent years that only now is being felt in the form of
decreased salmon returns. The report was headed by former fisheries and environment minister, John
Fraser, and is referred to as the Fraser Report. See Connelly, supra note 35, at A6.
50. Licence Fee, supra note 2, at 1. These choices refer to the decision to build hydroelectric dams
on salmon spawning rivers, and to industrialization in general, that have harmed salmon spawning habitats.
As the Fraser Report suggests, Canada has also been guilty of some of these same faults.
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C. The Inside Passage Transit Fee
During the salmon treaty negotiations in early 1994, Canada concluded
that the United States was not seriously responding to Canada's urgent
concerns. Tobin blamed the United States for the failure of the
negotiations.5' Accordingly, he decided to take decisive action to force the
United States seriously to address Canada's concerns.52 Tobin hoped to force
the U.S. federal government to make the various U.S. parties resolve their
differences in order to improve the possibility of negotiations with Canada.
In addition, Tobin wanted to bring the conservation issue to the attention of
the U.S. public. 3
Accordingly, on June 15, 1994, Canada imposed a transit fee on all U.S.
commercial fishing boats using the Canadian Inside Passage. This waterway,
otherwise known as the Inland Passage or Marine Highway, is a natural
sheltered route that runs through channels and straits between British
Columbia's islands and mainland British Columbia.54 The Passage provides
shelter from the fierce North Pacific storms for small to medium sized vessels
travelling between Washington and Alaska. The Canadians considered the fee
a particularly apt method to deal with the salmon treaty problem. They felt
that it would impose a burden on those who, in Canada's opinion, were going
to purloin Canadian fish, and that it also would catch the attention of the U.S.
media.-5
Enforcing the fee was perhaps the easiest aspect of the whole dispute for
Canada. Canada mobilized a large fleet in the Inside Passage to ensure that
all U.S. commercial fishing boats paid the fee. The area patrolled was not
very large, and U.S. boats were easily spotted. The Canadian officer in
charge of enforcement at the southern end of the passage correctly boasted
that "[t]hey can't get by us here." 6 The Canadians used fast, rigid-hulled
inflatable boats, numerous conventional craft, helicopters, and land based
stations to spot and stop any U.S. boat that did not display the fee decal on
51. Tobin Announces Advisory Panel On Pacific Salmon, CANADA DEP'T OF FISHERIES AND
OCEANs, NEWS RELEASEICOMMUNIQUt NR-FR-94-28E, June 9, 1994.
For the 1994 salmon fishery, negotiations with U.S. representatives have produced no
substantive progress on two key treaty principles: fishery conservation and the fair balance of
interceptions by each country's fishers. The United States has made no practical proposal on
either of these principles .... [Mr. Tobin said,] 'Negotiations with the United States on
fishing arrangements for 1994 have been frustrated by divergent positions within the U.S.
delegation. This has called into question the negotiating process and led to the current
stalemate.'
Id.
52. Id. ("'One thing is obvious. We need to take a strong stand to bring the United States back to
the table for meaningful negotiations.'") (quoting Minister Tobin).
53. Rob Tucker, Rift Hurts Treaty Chances, Salmon Prospects Dim, Canadian Says, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 1994, at D2.
54. See supra Figure 1 (points 13, 12, 6, 5, 10, and 7).
55. See Licence Fee, supra note 2, at 1. The Minister noted that "'[it is impossible to conduct
business as usual with U.S. vessels when some are traversing Canadian waters to overfish more Canadian-
origin fish in 1994 than they did in 1993.'" Id.
56. Tim Klass, Salmon Fleet Pays Price for Passage, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 19, 1994,
at Al.
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the boat's wheel house.
57
When U.S. salmon fishers first heard of the proposed fee, they did not
believe that the Canadians would actually enforce compliance. Many fishers
based in the Pacific Northwest left for Alaskan fishing grounds without the
necessary fee vouchers affixed to their boats.5 8 Some boats did not even have
the correct form of payment; they either had U.S. dollars or they hoped to
pay by check, neither of which was acceptable. 59 Those boats without the fee
decal were shocked to find armed Canadian patrol boats and helicopters
blocking their passage to Alaska. They were forced to go directly to the
nearest Canadian port to pay or to wait for funds to arrive by wire before they
were allowed to proceed." Fishers in Seattle who did try to pay the fee had
to travel at their own expense, prior to sailing, to the nearest Canadian port
where payment would be accepted, pay the fee, and then return to Seattle.
Overall, the fee created substantial costs in time and resources for both
the Canadians, through enforcement costs, and the U.S. fishers, through the
actual cost of the fee and through lost time involved with the fee.6 By the
time the fee was lifted, approximately three hundred boats had paid the fee,
including a few boats returning south from Alaska to the lower forty-eight
states.62 Very few fishermen risked the dangers of the alternative open sea
route to avoid paying the fee. 3 The cost and inconvenience suffered by the
U.S. fishers were communicated to the U.S. government, which reacted
quickly to the Canadian action.
D. The U.S. Government's Reaction to the Fee
1. The Executive Branch
The fee elicited a reaction from both the State Department and the Vice
President. Each had a separate role in the resolution of the fee dispute. The
State Department presented the official U.S. condemnation of the fee while
the Vice President worked behind the scenes to resolve the dispute as quickly
and efficiently as possible.
The State Department's initial reaction to the fee was to assert
57. Id. At the southern end of the passage, there were roughly forty rigid-hulled inflatable boats that
could travel over 50 knots (well over two or three times the speed most fishing boats are capable of
reaching), and about 25 conventional vessels, some over 180 feet long. Many of the "land based stations"
were simply manned lighthouses that had been scheduled to become unmanned and fully automatic.
58. Id.
59. Tim Klass, U.S. Boats Pay Canadian Fee; Plenty of Confusion As New Transit Requirements Go
into Effect, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, June 16, 1994, at D1.
60. Klass, supra note 56, at Al.
61. Fishermen Fume, supra note 3, at At. In this article Pete Knutson, president of the Seattle local
of the United Southeast Alaska Gillnetters' Association, claimed that average income for the fleet was
$10,000 to $25,000 per boat for six months of work. The $1100 fee was a significant drain on that
income. I suspect that those figures refer to average income for an individual crew member, usually
numbering between two and four for the average salmon gillnetter.
62. Klass, supra note 59, at DI.
63. Number of Vessels Paying the Fee, DEP'T OF STATE, OES PRESS GUIDANCE, June 27, 1994, at
1 [hereinafter Vessels Paying the Fee]. As of June 24, five days before the fee was lifted, 197 vessels had
paid the fee, while 10 chose to go through the open waters route, two of which had intended to take that
route anyway.
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"conclusively that the fee is inconsistent with international law."64 The
Department did not specifically articulate the reasons for the fee's illegality;
it merely stated that the fee was "inconsistent with rights guaranteed to vessels
under customary international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. "61 In addition, the State Department
pointed out that the fee also violated Canada's transit and nondiscrimination
obligations under GATT and NAFTA.66 Finally, the State Department added
that the fee violated a host of unnamed Canadian commitments to the United
States. In its early criticism of the Canadian action, the State Department
probably did not want to be too specific, for both diplomatic and legal
reasons. Tensions would have increased between the two countries had the
State Department conclusively indicted the Canadian government.
Nevertheless, the State Department unequivocally rejected Canada's
justifications for imposing the fee. The State Department responded to
Canada's claim that the United States had not participated in the treaty
negotiations by asserting that Canada "ha[d] rejected all U.S. efforts to find
a compromise on this issue and ha[d] thus far been unwilling to swerve from
a negotiating strategy that would result in the closure of traditional U.S.
fisheries. "6' The State Department also claimed that Canada was
oversimplifying the issues surrounding northwest salmon conservation and
management. 69 The Department turned Canada's accusation on its head and
claimed that, in fact, the Canadians were damaging U.S. conservation efforts
by continuing to fish the endangered salmon species that the Northwest had
closed to fishing in order to build up stocks."
The State Department also rejected Canada's claim that the United States
was unwilling to help with Canada's salmon conservation management. The
Department noted that Canada had only listed one endangered salmon stock
and that the United States had offered to help Canada come up with a joint
plan to conserve that species.71 The State Department asserted that, unlike
the Washington and Oregon stocks, the Canadian stocks had been "returning
in record numbers."72 Furthermore, the State Department claimed that the
Canadian conservation success was the product of a joint effort by Canada and
the United States, a joint effort that the State Department said was also
64. Canada's Transit Fee, DEP'T OF STATE, OES PRESS GUIDANCE, June 15, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter
Canada's Transit Fee].
65. Id. The "as reflected" language above highlights the fact that the United States has not signed
the UNCLOS but, for the most part, has accepted it as embodying customary principles of international
law. The exceptions are not applicable to this dispute. For the fee's illegality under the UNCLOS, see Part
III.A.1.
66. Canada's Transit Fee, supra note 64, at 1. For the fee's illegality under GATT, see Part
I.A.2.a.
67. Canada's Transit Fee, supra note 64, at 1.
68. Equity Issue Under the Pacific Salmon Treaty, DEP'T OF STATE, OES PRESS GUIDANCE, June
10, 1994, at 1.
69. Id.
70. Conservation Issue Under the Pacific Salmon Treaty, DEP'T OF STATE, OES PRESS GUIDANCE,
June 10, 1994, at 1 ("[Plopulations of U.S. stocks of chinook and coho salmon ... are seriously
depressed this year. Some of these stocks are already listed under the Endangered Species Act.").
71. See id. The endangered Canadian salmon stock is the early skeena coho.
72. See id. Like the Canadians, the U.S. State Department erroneously believed that Canada's
conservation efforts had been successful.
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essential for generally rebuilding northwest stocks. 73
The State Department attempted to resolve the dispute through diplomatic
channels and left the issue of reimbursement and retaliation to Congress. 74
This left the Department free to work on the removal of the fee.
In order to expedite the removal of the fee, the State Department appealed
to President Clinton to help with the increasingly tense situation. Vice
President Gore was given the task by the White House. In an act that
underscored the seriousness of the situation, Gore first met to discuss the
dispute with the National Security Council.7' He then met with the highest
levels of the Canadian government and quickly and peacefully resolved the
issue by promising that the United States would return to the negotiating table
in an effort to resolve the underlying Pacific Salmon Treaty issues.76 Since
the resolution of the fee dispute, the State Department and Gore have
continued these efforts.?
2. The Legislative Branch
Congress reacted quite vocally to the imposition of the fee. The fishing
industry supplies one of the nation's primary food sources, and the industry
supports numerous constituencies. Even today, the Alaskan salmon fishery is
the nation's most important. The strong congressional response was,
therefore, no surprise.78
The political representatives of those connected to this important industry
responded to the Canadian transit fee quickly and passionately. A few senators
proposed that the U.S. Coast Guard escort U.S. fishing boats through the
Canadian Inside Passage. 79 They also individually denounced the Canadian
action as inconsistent with international law and with Canada's obligations to
the United States as embodied in many treaties and agreements. Both houses
of Congress condemned the fee as a threat to the safety of U.S. fishing boats
that sought to avoid the fee by traveling through the more dangerous open
73. Effectiveness of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, DEP'T OF STATE, OES PRESS GUIDANCE, June 10,
1994, at 1 ("Canada has done an excellentjob rebuilding Fraser [River] stocks from near extinction earlier
this century. The United States has been instrumental for decades in this effort.... The United States
now needs that kind of Canadian cooperation in turning around the dramatic decline in depressed U.S.
stocks.").
74. Now that the amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act has passed, it is the U.S. State
Department that will be responsible for reimbursing those fishers who paid the transit fee.
75. National Security Council Will Enter Salmon Dispute, MORNING NEWS TRM. (Tacoma, Wash.),
June 18, 1994, at B7.
76. Truehart, supra note 9, at A29.
77. The State Department is still involved in ongoing negotiations and meetings with the Canadians
to resolve the dispute. Averting Salmon War, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 13, 1996, available in
WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
78. One U.S. official observed that "'fish have much more active political constituencies than Bosnia
or Rwanda. We are talking about jobs and incomes, matters near and dear to the hearts of legislators.'"
Truehart, supra note 9, at A29.
79. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 13, at AI (citing comments by Senator Slade Gordon (R-Wash.));
Charles Truehart, U.S., Canada to Renew Talks on Fishing Treaty; Ottawa Agrees to Scrap Disputed
Transit Fee, WASH. POST, July 3, 1994, at A25 (citing comments by Senator Frank Murkowski (R-
Alaska)).
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waters of the North Pacific.80
Although the popular conception is that the President is responsible for
foreign policy, Congress has considerable authority in this area."1 Thus, the
reaction of Congress to the fee should not just be disregarded as election year
politicking. Congress' reaction to the Canadian fee was embodied in an
amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 (FPA)."2 Congress
first approached the subject in the heat of the moment, when U.S. boats were
being stopped and taken to Canadian ports to pay the fee. Both houses
attempted to amend the FPA in such a way as to deal with the Canadian fee,
but were unable to reconcile their language in time for the bill to be voted on
while the incident was still an urgent issue. The amendment to the FPA was
finally passed by Congress on October 24, 1995." 3
The 1967 FPA originally was designed to deal with the illegal seizure of
U.S. fishing boats by a foreign government. The FPA provides that U.S.
fishers can be directly reimbursed by the U.S. government for the fines and
other costs associated with illegal seizures by foreign governments.'
However, the FPA did not cover the reimbursement of illegal transit fees
imposed on U.S. fishing boats. The amendment, which was tailored to apply
to the Canadian fees, rectifies this omission. 5 The amendment also directs
the Secretary of State to take action to recover that reimbursement from the
offending country. 6 Those fishers who were forced to pay the transit fee to
Canada will be reimbursed by the U.S. government. The U.S. government
will then try to get that money back from Canada. This arrangement sparked
the recent renewal of the fee dispute.
80. The amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act found that:
ITihis action was inconsistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, and, in particular, Article 26 of that Convention, which specifically
prohibits such fees, and threatened the safety of United States commercial fishermen who
sought to avoid the fee by traveling in less protected waters.
141 CONG. REC. H10,676 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995).
81. While it is true that the executive has gradually become preeminent in foreign affairs, the
Constitution still grants to Congress the power to set duties, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; the power
to regulate foreign commerce, see id. art I, § 8, cf. 3; the power "to define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," see id. art. I, § 8, cl.
10; the power to declare war, see id. art I, § 8, ci. 11, and grants the Senate the power to ratify treaties
and appoint ambassadors, see id. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
82. See Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).
83. See 141 CONG. REC. D1244 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1995). However, had there been an immediate
need for the amendment, it would have been ready to be voted on at any time. The language of the
amendment was basically unchanged from July 1994 to October 1995.
84. See 22 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
85. Fisheries Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-43, sec. 402(a), § 11(a), 109 Stat. 366, 389 (1996).
In any case on or after June 15, 1994, in which a vessel of the United States exercising its
right of passage is charged a fee by the government of a foreign country to engage in transit
passage between points in the United States (including a point in the exclusive economic zone
or in an area over which jurisdiction is in dispute), and such fee is regarded by the United
States as being inconsistent with international law, the Secretary of State shall, subject to the
availability of appropriated funds, reimburse the vessel owner for the amount of any such fee
paid under protest.
Id.
86. Id. sec. 402(a), § 11(e) ("The Secretary of State shall take such action as the Secretary deems
appropriate to make and collect claims against the foreign country imposing such fee for any amounts
reimbursed under this section.").
364 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 349
Just requiring Canadian reimbursement of the fee would not stop Canada
or another country from imposing a similar fee in the future. Accordingly,
Congress included language in the amendment that effectively engaged in a
"tit for tat" strategy with any country whose illegal transit fees hurt U.S.
fishing boats.87 The amendment directs the President to "impose similar
conditions" on an offending state's vessels.8 However, the ultimate
determination of whether the amendment applies to a particular transit fee lies
in the hands of the executive branch. It is up to the discretion of the executive
branch whether to label a transit fee a violation of international law to which
the FPA amendment provisions would apply.8 9
The amendment also addresses the Canadian action. Discussing the
Canadian fee explicitly, the amendment directs the President to insure that the
U.S. Coast Guard can protect U.S. fishers, enforce the law, and keep the
peace in the Northwest.9" Furthermore, the amendment directs the President
to review all relations between the two countries with an eye toward
persuading Canada not to impose a fee again.9 In addition, the amendment
enables the President to take particular action against Canada if it reinstates
the fee.92 This directive could have had ominous consequences if the dispute
had not been quickly resolved.
When Canada imposed the fee in June 1994, it caught Congress napping.
Canada was able to exploit congressional inertia and use the fee before
Congress could adequately respond. Now that the amendment to the FPA is
law, it is doubtful that Canada or any other state would use such a transit fee
against U.S. fishing vessels.
The United States was able to take two different approaches to the
87. See id. sec. 402(b), § 12.
88. Id. sec. 402(b), § 12(b) ("[Tlhe President shall direct the heads of Federal agencies to impose
similar conditions on the operation or transit of fishing vessels registered under the laws of the nation
which has imposed conditions on United States fishing vessels.").
89. See id. § 402(b).
90. Id. § 401.
The Congress finds that.., the President should ensure that, consistent with international
law, the United States Coast Guard has available adequate resources in the Pacific Northwest
and Alaska to provide for the safety of United States citizens, the enforcement of United States
law, and to protect the rights of the United States and keep the peace among vessels operating
in disputed waters ....
Id.
91. Id.
The Congress finds that .... the President should continue to review all agreements between
the United States and Canada to identify other actions that may be taken to convince Canada
that any reinstatement of the transit license fee would be against Canada's long-term interests,
and should immediately implement any actions which the President deems appropriate if
Canada reinstates the fee; . . .the President should continue to convey to Canada in the
strongest terms that the United States will not now, nor at any time in the future, tolerate any
action by Canada which would impede or otherwise restrict the right of passage of vessels of
the United States in a manner inconsistent with international law ....
Id.
92. Id. ("[The President] should immediately implement any actions which the President deems
appropriate if Canada reinstates the fee."). This congressional authorization is particularly important for
the powers of the President. See Justice Jackson's important concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube, which asserts that where Congress has spoken on a particular subject, the Executive may act so as
to carry out Congress' desire without further immediate consultation with Congress. Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 578, 635-36 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Canadian fee due to the separation of powers in the U.S. government.
Congress was able to pursue a unilateral, aggressive response to the fee, while
the executive branch pursued a bilateral, negotiated resolution of the fee.
Other countries are aware of the United States' separation of powers and are
not surprised when the executive branch and legislature pursue different and
independent strategies to address a dispute. Consequently, during the fee
dispute, it was perfectly reasonable that the executive and legislative branches
pursued different approaches to the Canadian fee.
However, had Congress managed to pass the amendment to the FPA
during the dispute, it would have forced the executive branch to decide
whether to employ the amendment's unilateral responses to the Canadian
transit fee. Because the executive branch was not constrained by the
amendment, it could work on removing the fee peacefully through bilateral
negotiations with Canada.
3. The Pacific Salmon Dispute After the Fee
Fortunately, the fee was lifted through peaceful bilateral negotiations.
There were no violent incidents between U.S. fishing boats and Canadian
enforcement officials.93 However, there was an unavoidable escalation of
tension in the region.94 The tension was most problematic along the disputed
northern boundary of the passage at Dixon Entrance.' For the first time
since July 1992, a Canadian vessel was seized in the Dixon Entrance by the
U.S. Coast Guard for allegedly fishing in those disputed waters.96 Even
though both parties claimed that the incident was not related to the transit fee
dispute, the seizure highlighted the potential for a rapid escalation of tensions
if the dispute were not quickly resolved. No doubt this escalation contributed
to the resolution of the immediate problem posed by the fee. Three days after
the Dixon Entrance incident, Canada and the United States reached an
agreement that led to the rescission of the fee. The Canadians removed the fee
after Gore promised that the United States would return to the bargaining
table for further negotiations."
The renewed July talks were no more successful than those at the
beginning of 1994. After a few days, the talks collapsed. During this new
impasse, Canada instituted a very aggressive fishing policy, "Canadian
Fishery on Canadian Stocks," under which the Canadians attempted to catch
Fraser River salmon before they could reach U.S. waters and be caught by
93. Based on the author's experience in Alaska, this fear was not groundless; -considering that
numerous fishing boats carry small arms, and some fishing boats have resorted to those arms in the past.
94. See Klass, supra note 59, at D1. There was evidence of increasing tension in the area as the fee
continued to be applied. One U.S. citizen involved in the dispute summed up the tension: "'This is what
started the [W]ar of 1812, foreign vessels boarding U.S. vessels and searching them .... This thing's
gotten really snaky, and I'm really afraid that some hothead is going to do something crazy.'" Id.
95. For a discussion of the dispute between the United States and Canada over Dixon Entrance, see
Donald McRae, Canada and the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY:
NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 1, at 145, 147-48; supra Figure 1.
96. Canadians Cry Foul: Fishennan Call Seized Vessel an International Pawn, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, July 1, 1994, at E3.
1 97. See id.; Truehart, supra note 9, at A29.
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U.S. fishers.9" This policy resulted in the catch of more fish than was
warranted, given the low stocks of salmon. However, fear that this policy
would be repeated in 1995 effectively destroyed the Northwest's resistance to
a negotiated settlement with Canada. Senator Patty Murray, a Democrat from
Washington state, summed up the Northwest's attitude towards Canada's
aggressive fishing policy by stating, "If we don't get a treaty with Canada,
and they decide to fish us out, everything we do to save salmon will be for
naught. "
Once the fee was rescinded and the resultant talks failed to satisfy
Canada, there was a possibility that Canada would reinstate the transit fee. At
that time, there were occasional voices within the Canadian government that
called for this extreme action.'" ° Nonetheless, the fee was not reinstated
either in 1994 or in 1995, even though Canada once again felt that the United
States had failed to address Canada's concerns.
There are many possible reasons why the Canadians did not reinstate the
transit fee in those years. First, Canada had achieved its immediate goal -
the return of the United States to the bargaining table with a commitment to
engage in good faith negotiations. Second, the amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act would have been applied to any new Canadian fee. t" t That
amendment would have resulted in significant inconvenience to Canada's
merchant fleet and would also have led to an escalation of tensions that the
Canadians were unwilling to allow. In addition, by the start of the 1995
fishing season, it should have been quite evident to Canada that both the
Northwest and the U.S. government were seriously trying to negotiate a new
salmon treaty and, hence, that there was no need for aggressive Canadian
action against those parties.' 2 Rather, it was Alaska's refusal to join in the
interim conservation plan that was the main obstacle in 1995. The fee was not
an effective tool against Alaska as it generally did not affect many Alaskan
98. See Connelly, supra note 35, at A6; see also Robert M. Thorstenson, Jr., Pacific Sahnon Treaty
the Way to Conserve, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 1, 1995, at J3 (letter to editor criticizing
Canadian "fish war" in 1994 salmon season). One of the Canadian salmon negotiators said after the July
talks failed that Canada had instituted an aggressive fishing policy in its waters to "catch what we can."
Talks Go Nowhere, ANCHORAGE DAiLY NEws, July 16, 1994, at D6.
99. Joel Connelly, Sahnon Plan Proposed to Canada, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 23,
1994, at Al. Certainly by the start of the fishing season, when the northwest states' support for a new
treaty was evident, the Canadians abandoned any possibility that they would engage in a repeat of the 1994
aggressive fishing aimed at the Pacific Northwest. See Hall, supra note 16, at A3.
100. See Talks Go Nowhere, supra note 98, at D6 ("[Clanada's negotiator with the Pacific Salmon
Commission, Jack Nichol.... said Canada should reinstate the [United States] $1100 fee. .. ").
101. For details of how that amendment would hurt Canada, see Part II.D.2 of this Article. In
addition, one study of this dispute claimed that Canadian fear of an oil pollution levy on Canadian vessels
using the Strait of Juan de Fuca contributed to the Canadian recision of the fee. See McDorman, supra
note 23, at 503 n.177; see also Wayne Hottenbach, Rough Waters in the Straits of Juan de Fuca, 10
OCEAN POL'Y NEws 1, 6-7 (1993).
102. Southeast Toll Season, supra note 40. As mentioned earlier in note 99 and its accompanying
text, the Northwest was effectively neutralized due to its fear of a repeat of Canadian aggressive fishing
of "Northwest" salmon. "If there is no treaty, Canada has said it would be within its rights to 'maximize'
interception of salmon headed to spawn in Northwest rivers." Connelly, supra note 99, at Al.
Furthermore, Tobin said that he did not "want to take action that would penalize native groups and
commercial fishermen in the Pacific Northwest that had agreed with Canada on conservation measures."
Id.; see John Urquhart, State's Refisal to Accept Limit on Catch of Fish Criticized As Hindering
Conservation, WALL ST. J., July 5, 1995, at B6.
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salmon fishing boats. 3 Similarly, Canadian aggressive fishing in 1994,
apart from damaging Canada's own fragile salmon stocks, did not result in a
large immediate impact on Alaska. Hence, for all his strong talk," Tobin
probably never intended to reinstate the fee or the aggressive fishing policy.
Once the 1994 fishing season was over, talks resumed between the two
countries. One proposal suggested by the United States would have resulted
in the United States paying Canada a cash sum to settle past inequities in
salmon harvests. In return, there would be a new method of calculating quotas
to insure a more rigid conservation mechanism for the future."05 However,
Canada and the United States were unable to come to any agreement over
these proposals. At that point, the parties realized that outside mediation was
necessary to resolve the dispute."o
With the long term solution to the dispute unresolved, the parties focused
on a short term interim agreement to cover the 1995 salmon season. 7 This
interim agreement also appeared to be destined to fail once it became apparent
that the Alaskans were going to refuse to restrict their catch to the low levels
required under the agreement. The interim agreement required that Alaska cut
its catch of chinook salmon to 140,000 for 1995.1" Alaska rejected this
figure in favor of its own scientists' calculations, since those would allow
Alaska a larger catch without endangering the salmon stocks." 9 Relying on
its own assessment of the salmon situation, Alaska unilaterally decided to
allow a catch of over 230,000 chinook salmon."0 Even though Alaska
refused to take part in the conservation measure, Canada felt that for the good
of the salmon stocks it had to introduce significant cuts in its own salmon
catch allowances. For the 1995 salmon fishing season, Canada cut its chinook
catch from over 200,000 to 60,000 while at the same time reducing its other
salmon allocations."' Vice President Gore pleaded with the Alaskans to
drop their catch to just 200,000 chinook, but Alaska Governor Tony Knowles
103. This is not strictly accurate, as many of the fishing boats that were forced to pay the fee were
Alaskan boats returning to Alaska after having carried out work in Seattle. However, in comparison to the
total number of salmon fishing boats, it was not a significant number.
104. Consider this example of Tobin's "strong talk": "This situation is not acceptable to the
Government of Canada. Canada will respond. And all options are on the table." Wood, supra note 41,
at 12. The aggressive fishing policy would also have had no immediate affect on Alaska. This Article will
not examine the legal and moral/ethical issues surrounding Canada's decision to overfish an endangered
fish stock. No doubt a whole article could be written focusing just on the aggressive fishing in 1994.
105. Fish Proposal, SEATrLE PosT-NTELLIGENCER, Dec. 24, 1994, at All.
106. Unite to Save Salmon, Canada's Tobin tells U.S., SEATTLE POST-INTELLGENCER, May 12,
1995, at A2 [hereinafter Unite to Save Sahnon].
107. Id.
108. Baldrige 11, 898 F. Supp. at 1485. The Chinook Technical Committee, created pursuant to
annex IV, chapter 3 of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, suggested this catch allocation. See Pacific Salmon
Treaty, supra note 1, annex IV, ch. 3.
109. Id. This case describes the difference between Alaska's method of calculation and the other
parties' methods of calculating the numbers of salmon that could safely be caught. In the end, Judge
Rothstein ruled that Alaska's method was unproven and hence should not have been relied on given the
dangerous condition of the salmon stocks.
110. Southeast Toll Season, supra note 40.
111. See Tobin Should Stand Finn, supra note 8, at 8.
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refused to go below 230,000.112
In short, all attempts to persuade the Alaskans to join in the interim
agreement failed. Alaska's refusal to join the interim agreement resulted in a
great deal of speculation that Canada would repeat its aggressive policy of the
previous year. In the period between the 1994 and 1995 salmon seasons,
Canada attempted to show a tough face to the United States. However, it was
apparent to Canada that a new nonconfrontational policy was necessary in the
wake of the near collapse of Canada's fishing resources.' By the spring of
1995, Tobin had significantly toned down his aggressive stance.114 Other
than an impromptu attempt by Canadian fishers to stop an Alaskan ferry, the
Canadians did not repeat the previous year's confrontational policies."15
Thus, when the 1995 salmon season started, it appeared as though Alaskan
fishers would again take their potentially destructive salmon quota.
4. The Dispute Goes to Court
While Alaska could get away with ignoring the other parties, it could not
ignore the power of the U.S. judiciary. In the summer of 1995, the Pacific
Northwest native tribes used the federal courts to assert their historic fishing
rights, as they had done in the original Pacific Salmon Treaty. Throughout the
dispute, native tribes from the Pacific Northwest had warned that, if their
needs were not met, they might return to the litigation tactics of the previous
decade to enforce these needs." 6 Accordingly, they filed suit in federal
district court - with Canada and the states of the Northwest as amici
curiae - seeking a preliminary injunction to close Alaska's southeast chinook
fishery. They sought to enforce the 1985 Baldrige settlement agreement, 17
which enforced treaty obligations due those tribes dating from the 1850s. n8
Alaska sought to have the suit dismissed, claiming that the court did not
have jurisdiction to enforce the Pacific Salmon Treaty, and that even if it did,
112. Southeast Toll Season, supra note 40. Vice President Gore was forced to plead with Alaska due
to the unanimity requirement of the Pacific Salmon Treaty catch allocation mechanism in combination with
the requirement that Alaska be a voting member in that process. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
113. Connelly, supra note 35, at A6. Tobin said that Canada was "'not going to be pursuing an
aggressive fishing strategy this year.'" A Canadian nonaggressive policy was especially suitable following
the Fraser Report's harsh criticism of Canada's Pacific coast salmon habitat and fisheries conservation.
The report of a Canadian commission headed by John Fraser, a former Canadian Fisheries and
Environment Minister, stated that the Pacific coast salmon habitat could be described as "'an awful
problem up and down the whole coast.'" Id.; see also Cynthia Osterman, Canadian Reforms Aimed at
Rebuilding Salmon Stocks, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 8, 1995, at A2.
114. See Joel Connelly, Unite to Save Salmon, Canada's Tobin Tells U.S., SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 12, 1995, at A2. Tobin said, "We want a partnership .... We need an agreement
that preserves fish in both countries." Id.
115. Fishermen, Irked at Salmon Spat, Prevent Alaska Ferry from Docking, AP, July 9, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database. About 300 Canadian boats were involved in stopping an
Alaskan ferry from docking for three hours in Prince Rupert.
116. Sandi Doughton, The Viewfrom the Boats: Issues in the U.S.-Canada Salmon War, MORNING
NEWs TRiB. (Tacoma, Wash.), July 3, 1994, at Al.
117. Baldrige I, 605 F. Supp. at 834-37.
118. The obligations arose under the Stevens and Palmer treaties between the U.S. government and
native tribes. General Palmer, Governor of the Oregon territory, was involved in the negotiations, which
occurred at Camp Stevens in Walla Walla Valley, Washington. See Marsh v. Union Pac. R.R., 304 F.
Supp. 478, 479 (D. Or. 1969).
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Alaska's conduct was not in violation of that treaty. Judge Rothstein first ruled
that the issue was not whether the court had jurisdiction to determine issues
involved in the Pacific Salmon Treaty but whether Alaska had violated the
settlement agreement resulting from the 1985 suit, a contract between Alaska
and the plaintiffs. 119 Having determined that the issue was contract
interpretation, Judge Rothstein ruled that the court had jurisdiction to hear the
suit."2 Judge Rothstein then examined the merits of the case and issued an
injunction prohibiting commercial fishing by most of Alaska's southeast
salmon fisheries."' The injunction halted the fishing of the last 55,000
chinook salmon of Alaska's controversial 230,000 quota." 2 In addition, the
injunction will force Alaska to return to the bargaining table but with a
reduced veto power and an incentive to resolve the dispute.'" Unless there
is a resolution to the salmon dispute, Alaska will face the possibility of a
similar costly injunction next year. Alaska has appealed the ruling, but the
Ninth Circuit's decision will be handed down too late to affect the 1995
salmon season. Moreover, a reversal Would only bolster Alaska's power in the
salmon negotiations. Thus, once again U.S. courts have it in their power to
help resolve the Pacific salmon dispute. However, it should not be forgotten
that this power results from the courts' role in adjudicating rights between
parties based on earlier settlements. In other words, the courts are merely
enforcing a contract, not making international law or policy.
The dispute has also been adjudicated by an international mediator,
Charles Beeby, New Zealand's former ambassador to France. 24 In
September 1995, both parties agreed to submit the dispute to nonbinding
mediation."a However, when Beeby finally delivered his recommendation
in January 1996, the United States rejected his proposals. Once again, the
Canadians were upset at the United States' negotiating posture,1 26 and thus
the 1996 salmon negotiations got off to a shaky start.
In March 1996, following publication of the amendment to the FPA, there
were calls within Canada for a tough stance towards the United States. For
example, the recently elected British Columbian premier called for the
119. Baldrige i, 898 F. Supp. at 1483-84.
120. Id. at 1484.
121. Specifically, the preliminary injunction prohibited "the State of Alaska from authorizing directed
marine chinook salmon fisheries or authorizing the retention of chinook salmon in marine fisheries south
of Cape Suckling for the remainder of the accounting year which ends September 30, 1995." Id. at 1479.
122. Scott Sunde, Ruling on Chinook Big Blow to Alaska; No Fishing for Kings in Southeast of State,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 8, 1995, at BI.
123. Baldrige II, 898 F. Supp. at 1477. On hearing of the successful conclusion of the suit, Tobin
remarked, "'This is victory for conservation and common sense and puts an end to the notion that one of
the partners in a multi-stakeholder partnership can dictate the terms of the fishery to all other
stakeholders.'" Tobin Praises Court Ruling on Alaska Salnon Fishing, Eco-Loa WK., Sept. 15, 1995,
at 1.
124. David Hogben, U.S. Rejects Proposals to End Salmon Dispute, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 13,
1996, at Al.
125. Unite to Save Salmon, supra note 106, at A2. This was also a compromise in that the Canadians
wanted the equity issue to go to binding arbitration, while the United States was not happy about bringing
in any outsiders.
126. Hogben, supra note 124, at B8. "'To put it mildly, Canada is very frustrated, very disappointed
that the U.S. engaged in this process as we did in Canada, but has refused to entertain the suggestions
made by this eminent person . . . .'" Id. (quoting Canada's chief negotiator, Yves Fortier).
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reintroduction of the transit fee: "It is my contention that British Columbia
and Canada cannot tolerate this incursion on Canadian sovereignty ...and
a transit fee should be reimposed in order to get the Americans to take
seriously their obligations for conservation of salmon in these waters."127
I. THE LAW
This section of the Article examines the legality of the transit fee under
traditional international law, under treaty law, and under the emerging
customary international law doctrine of countermeasures. The examination
will reveal that under traditional international law, the fee would be
considered illegal. However, when the doctrine of countermeasures is brought
into the equation, Canada's breach of its traditional international law
obligations is transformed into a legitimate action by a state involved in a
dispute. Canada's Inside Passage transit fee can then be considered a justified
infraction of Canada's treaty law obligations.
A. International Treaty Law and the Fee
The legality of a state's action should first be examined with regard to the
relevant treaties. Thus, the Canadian Inside Passage transit fee will be
examined under Canada's international treaty obligations. In this incident, the
treaty that is primarily relevant is the UNCLOS. The transit fee is first and
foremost a restriction on marine traffic in furtherance of Canada's oceans
policy. Hence, the UNCLOS, as the preeminent international law on the sea,
will be the main focus of this section's examination of the Canadian transit
fee. To a lesser extent, the GATT is applicable. Finally, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), is necessary to the
determination of the fee's legality under treaty law because it can help in
interpreting the above treaties.
1. The Legality of the Fee Under the UNCLOS
a. Introduction
U.S. boats have been using the Inside Passage for over a century.' 28
The passage was extensively used by the United States during the Klondike
and Alaskan gold rushes at the turn of the last century. Today, the Inside
Passage is the main route for northwest fishing boats travelling to the rich
fishing grounds in Alaska and is the preferred route for Alaskan boats going
to Seattle for major repairs. The Inside Passage channels provide a safe and
127. See Joel Connelly, B.C. Talks Tough on Getting Fish Treaty, Premier Clark Wants to hnpose
Fee on U.S. Boats, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 12, 1996, at A4 (quoting B.C. Premier Glen
Clark). The dispute now is focusing on the nature of the Inside Passage - whether it is internal waters,
as the Canadians claim, or territorial seas, as the United States claims. See Jacques Lemieux, Canada, US
Squaring off in New Salmon War, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW,
Allnewsplus Database; see also infra Part III.A.1.
128. Fishennen Fume, supra note 3, at Al.
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sheltered passage for the small U.S. commercial fishing boats travelling
between the Pacific Northwest and southeast Alaska. These boats comprise a
large. share of all the fishing boats in Alaska and take part in the lucrative
commercial fisheries of salmon, black cod, halibut, herring, pollack, and
crab. The passage also is used by ferries and cruise ships that ply the larger
sections of the Inside Passage from Seattle to Alaska.
The alternative route between Alaska and the Northwest is through the
open waters of the North Pacific. This route is particularly rough,
unpredictable, and dangerous for most salmon fishing boats as they tend to be
quite small, on average only forty feet long. Every year, about one thousand
U.S. fishing boats go up to Alaska to fish.'29 The fact that most of those
boats use the busy Inside Passage with its many narrow channels and straits,
in preference to the unobstructed open sea routes, is evidence of the passage's
utility.
As noted above, the primary law that governs maritime disputes is the
UNCLOS. 30 Both the United States and Canada are bound by the pertinent
provisions of the UNCLOS as they affect this dispute. Although it has not
signed the convention, the United States has asserted that, for the most part,
the UNCLOS has become customary international law.' 3 ' Canada was one
of the first states to sign on to the UNCLOS, and, although it has not yet
ratified it, Canada is most likely bound by the provisions pertinent to this
dispute.' Thus, an examination of the Canadian transit fee under the
UNCLOS regime should shed light on the legality of such a fee.
The UNCLOS provides different legal regimes for different zones of the
sea. For example, the territorial sea is treated differently than internal waters.
In particular, there is no guaranteed right of innocent passage through internal
waters. However, as will be shown below, due to the unique situation of large
stretches of the Inside Passage, it appears that U.S. commercial fishing boats
have a right of innocent passage through those stretches regardless of the
Inside Passage's designation - whether the Inside Passage is internal waters
or territorial seas.
The inquiry in this section will focus on the right of innocent passage
through the Inside Passage, whether the fee is an acceptable infringement of
innocent passage, and whether the U.S. fishing boats' transit was innocent as
129. Canada and U.S. To Resume Stalled Salmon Talks, Reuters Newswire, July 2, 1994.
130. UNCLOS, supra note 4.
131. Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 1 PuB. PAPERS 378-79 (Mar. 10, 1983) (statement
of President Reagan). However, President Reagan's partial acceptance of the UNCLOS has led to
questions concerning the United States' role in the formal UNCLOS dispute resolution section. See W.
MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S. WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN MARITIME BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION 226-27 (1992). Because the UNCLOS governs the United States' obligations, the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, compels that the UNCLOS, and any
other international treaty to which the United States is a party, also governs subpolitical entities such as
the individual states.
132. JOSEPH SWEENY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 160
(3d ed. 1988). Canada signed the Convention on December 10, 1982. "[W]hen all the interested parties
have carefully negotiated and accepted a regime without dissent in a consensus document, it can become
a part of customary international law, thereby binding all states." McDorman, supra note 23, at 485.
133. Thus, the recent argument between the United States and Canada over the nature of this body
of water is irrelevant to the issue of the fee's legality. See Lemieux, supra note 127.
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that term is applied in each of the different sea zone regimes. These inquiries
will be dealt with for each of the different possible characterizations of the
Inside Passage - as internal waters, territorial waters, or as an international
strait. Thus, for an internal waters regime, this Article will first examine
whether the Inside Passage can be classified as internal waters, and then it
will examine the right of innocent passage within internal waters. If there is
such a right, then this Article will examine whether the fee is an acceptable
infringement of that innocent passage right and whether the U.S. fishing boat
transit would constitute innocent passage.
b. The Inside Passage as Internal Waters
Traditionally, the regime for internal waters allows the coastal state
almost the same sovereignty as it would exercise over its land.' 34 Therefore,
the practice was that in internal waters, there was no right of innocent
passage. That rule relied on the traditional definition of internal waters: that
they are generally considered to be waters to the landward side of the low
water mark along the coast.'35 Internal waters have included inland seas,
lakes, rivers, closed bays, and some inlets. For other coastal features, the
most important consideration for determining the internal waters relates to
baselines drawn around the coast. The landward side of the baselines is the
internal waters, and the seaward side is the territorial sea and the domain of
the UNCLOS, where the right of innocent passage prevails.' 36 Traditionally,
baselines were drawn to the contour of the coast along the low water line
regardless of the nature of the coast.
The modern trend allows countries to employ straight baselines where
their coast is "deeply indented."' 37 UNCLOS allows states with archipelagic
island systems and unusual coastlines to employ straight baselines and, hence,
enclose small sections of water as internal waters. 38 At least eighty
134. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 64 (1962)
("That a state has all the competence over its internal waters that it has over land areas within its
boundaries has long been accepted.").
135. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 5; see also Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116. For the
potential vagueness of this concept, see REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 131, at 5-10. The authors
describe the many different versions of "low water mark" employed by different states, e.g., one state uses
the "Indian springs low water mark." On the U.S. west coast the "lower low-water" is used while on the
east coast the "mean low-water" is used in Navy hydrographic charts. Id.
136. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 1 ("[W]aters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State."); see also id. art 4, para. 2 ("The drawing
of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and
the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to
the regime of internal waters.").
137. Id. art. 7, para. 1. The first major test of this practice was upheld in Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.),
1951 I.C.J. 116. Interestingly, the baseline argument usually is raised in order to define the territorial sea,
not to define the internal waters.
138. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 7, para. 1.
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.
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countries have employed straight baselines.1 39 Canada passed baseline
enabling legislation in 1965 and opted to employ straight baselines along
sections of the British Columbia coast in 1969." Specifically, Canada used
straight baselines along only the west coasts of Vancouver and the Queen
Charlotte Islands.' Absent explicit baseline legislation for the east coast of
Vancouver Island and for the mainland coast, it would appear that the
territorial sea starts at the low water mark along those coasts.
The transit fee applied to transit through the waterways "between
Vancouver Island and the mainland, Fitzhugh Sound, Finlayson Channel,
Princess Royal Channel, Principe Channel, Grenville Channel and Laredo
Sound.'142 A quick glance at the map in Figure 1 will show that, apart from
the waters between Vancouver Island and the mainland, these other channels
are narrow enough that they could be considered inland waterways and,
hence, internal waters. 43 However, the passage between Vancouver Island
and the mainland is sufficiently large, particularly at the Queen Charlotte
Strait and the Strait of Georgia, that those waters should be considered
territorial seas with the right of innocent passage for U.S. fishing boats."'
Canada could claim that those waterways are internal waters by arguing
that the baselines along the Vancouver and Charlotte Islands have the effect
of making everything to the east of those baselines internal waters. However,
for baselines to lawfully internalize sea areas, the areas enclosed by the
baselines have to be sufficiently connected to the land. 4' In other words, the
waters enclosed by the Canadian baselines must have the character of internal
waters for the enclosure to be permissible. Two factors to be considered when
deciding this point are whether international trade routes cut across these
waters and whether foreign vessels enter these waters for purposes other than
reaching the shore. 146 These waterways are used for international trade, and
139. REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 131, at 105. According to the thesis of this book many,
if not most, of those baselines are invalid under UNCLOS's rules for application of straight baselines. Id.
140. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C., ch. 22, § 5 (Can.). For straight baselines along
the west coasts of Queen Charlotte Island and Vancouver Island, see Orders in Council, P.C. 1969, at
1109 (May 26, 1969); see also DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
155, 182 (1988).
141. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, 2-70 to 2-90 (DoD
2005. 1-M 1987) (accompanying maps).
142. Licence Fee, supra note 2, at 1; see also supra Figure 1 (points 13, 12, 6, 5, 10, and 7,
respectively).
143. For the purpose of examining the transit fee, it is not necessary to explore the status of these
narrow straits. The problems of the large body of water between Vancouver Island and the mainland will
provide enough cause for criticism of the transit fee's legality.
144. Laredo Sound could possibly be considered territorial sea as well. Contrary to some jurists'
arguments, Canadian fishery closing lines across the Queen Charlotte Sound do not have the effect of
enclosing waters as internal waters. Nor does a transit regulation, exempting U.S. citizens from
requirements to obtain permission to transit the Inside Passage (dated from 1978), have the consequence
of creating internal waters where there were no internal waters before. But see McDorman, supra note
23, at, 497-501 (arguing that closing lines, Canadian judicial decisions, and transit regulations lend
considerable weight to Canada's argument that Inside Passage is internal waters with no right of innocent
passage).
145. "[T]he sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain
to be subject to the regime of internal waters." UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 7, para. 3; see also REISMAN
& WESTERMAN, supra note 131, at 98-100.
146. REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 131, at 100.
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U.S. boats travelling to Alaska have historically entered these waters with no
intention of landing anywhere in Canada. 147  Undoubtedly, the U.S.
commercial fishing boats involved in the salmon dispute only intended to
traverse the Canadian Inside Passage and not to stop anywhere in Canada.
148
Both of these factors argue against attributing internal waters status to these
sections of the Canadian Inside Passage.
Similarly, where the use of straight baselines results in the creation of
internal waters from waters which have historically been governed by a right
of innocent passage, that same right of innocent passage would still exist in
those waters after their enclosure by straight baselines. 49 If the Inside
Passage had previously been treated as territorial seas, or if U.S. fishing boats
had always exercised the right of innocent passage, then U.S. fishing boats
would still have a right of innocent passage to the same extent that the right
was guaranteed under the prior regime. Before Canada's application of
straight baselines in 1969, these waters would have been territorial or high
seas, depending on the distance from the low water mark. Canada's failure to
focus on its baselines before the 1960s lends support to the position that
innocent passage was unhampered in large portions of the Inside Passage.'
These waters probably would have been subject to the default regime, which
would not have classified them as internal waters, but rather as territorial seas
out to the then three mile limit, and then as high seas.
Even if U.S. vessels have a right of innocent passage through the
Canadian Inside Passage, it is not clear in the UNCLOS whether that right is
absolute.' Even in the territorial sea, the right of innocent passage is not
absolute. The UNCLOS says that when baselines create internal waters,
innocent passage shall be as "provided in this Convention."152 The question
arises whether this means innocent passage is subject to the limits for
territorial seas regulations as listed in articles 19 and 21. Logically, a coastal
state should have more power to enforce its regulations in its internal waters
than in its territorial sea. However, there is an argument for applying the laws
of the territorial sea regarding innocent passage, as this was the regime in
force before it became internal waters. It would then be consistent to continue
to apply the same regime. Because the UNCLOS is not clear on this matter,
Canada's action falls into a grey area.
147. See David Crary, U.S.-Canada Squabble Erupts over Usage of the Inside Passage, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 8, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
148. I have experienced this myself when returning to Seattle in a fishing boat by way of the
Canadian Inside Passage. I had wanted to go ashore in Canada, but the skipper of the boat refused, saying
that stopping in Canada would require him to complete reams of bureaucratic paperwork.
149. "Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in
article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal water areas which had not previously been considered as
such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters." UNCLOS,
supra note 4, art. 8, para. 2.
150. McRae, supra note 95, at 145.
151. Certainly, Congress thought that the U.S. boats had an innocent passage right. See Fisheries
Act of 1995, § 401, 109 Stat. at 388; 141 CONG. REC. H10,676 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) ("The Congress
finds that... customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
guarantee the right of passage, including innocent passage, to vessels through the waters commonly
referred to as the 'Inside Passage' off the Pacific Coast of Canada."). This language was also present in
the version of this bill presented in July 1994. 140 CONG. REC. S8548 (daily ed. July 12, 1994).
152. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 2.
Countermeasures in the Salmon Dispute
Apart from the possible grey area in the UNCLOS in situations where
territorial seas are changed by baselines into internal waters, it would appear
as though there are major portions of the Inside Passage that cannot be
classified as internal waters. Those areas should be subject to the territorial
waters regime, and hence U.S. fishing boats must be allowed innocent passage
to the extent that such passage in the territorial sea is guaranteed in the
UNCLOS.
c. The Inside Passage as Territorial Seas
The territorial sea extends up to twelve nautical miles from a coastal
state's baselines. 3 The rules that apply to a territorial sea do not allow
Canada as much freedom as the rules governing internal waters. Canadian
control over its territorial sea is governed entirely by the UNCLOS and other
rules of international law. 54 Thus, a unilateral Canadian action to change the
character of that control would be in violation of international law, and the
UNCLOS in particular. The UNCLOS devotes sixteen articles to innocent
passage through the territorial sea (articles 17 through 33). Article 17 affirms
that "ships of all states . . . enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea."
The annual migration of U.S. fishing boats through the Inside Passage
from the Northwest to the salmon rich waters of southeast Alaska falls within
the meaning of innocent passage in the UNCLOS. "' Similarly, the argument
that the U.S. fishing boats' passage is not innocent as that term is defined in
the UNCLOS is hard to sustain. For passage not to be innocent, a ship must
engage in activity that is "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State."156 Furthermore, such harmful activity must take place
while the vessel is in the territorial sea."7 There is certainly an argument that
these boats were travelling to Alaskan waters where they were going to
engage in an activity prejudicial to Canada's interests. However, the
UNCLOS does not provide that future, uncertain, or speculative acts will
result in a ship's passage becoming noninnocent. Nor does it say that acts that
will not occur within the coastal state's jurisdiction can prejudice a vessel's
passage so as to make its passage noninnocent. The list in article 19
describing activities that would constitute non-innocent passage is probably not
153. Id. art. 3. Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this convention.
154. Id. art. 2, para. 3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this
Convention and to other rules of international law.
155. Id. art. 18, para. 1.
Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of:
(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters ... ; or
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters ....
Id.
156. Id. art. 19, para. 1.
157. Id. art. 19, para. 2 ("Passage of a foreign ship shall be construed to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities .... .") (emphasis added). The list includes such activities as threats against the coastal state,
weapons discharges, spying, launching, or loading of other vessels or airplanes, willful pollution, fishing,
and "any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage." Id.
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exhaustive. Nonetheless, the general intention surrounding the concept of non-
innocent passage is that it involves activity within the jurisdiction of the
coastal state whereas the U.S. fishing boats only engaged in transit." 8 It
does not seem possible to classify the U.S. fishing boats' transit as anything
other than innocent passage as described in the UNCLOS.
The UNCLOS requires that a "coastal State shall not hamper the innocent
passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea.""5 9 Such hampering is
defined to include regulations that have the effect of denying innocent passage
or discriminating against particular foreign ships' right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea. Certainly the Canadian fee could be construed as
having denied such passage to boats that could not afford the fee or that did
not want to spend the considerable time and effort required to obtain the fee
sticker.'60 Similarly, the Canadian act of forcing boats to halt their passage
until they had sailed into the correct Canadian port and proffered the correct
amount of Canadian currency, at the correct time and at the correct office,
certainly "impaired" the fishing boats' innocent passage.
Congress and the State Department specifically pointed to the UNCLOS
article 26 obligations when criticizing the Canadian fee.' 6' Article 26 of the
UNCLOS explicitly forbids the imposition of a charge by a coastal state on
ships engaged in innocent passage through a territorial sea.' 62 Charges can
only be imposed for services rendered by the coastal state to the vessel. Nor
can these charges be applied to some countries' vessels and not to other
countries' vessels.' 63 As a charge aimed only at U.S. boats, the fee violated
this provision.'64
158. Id. (listing many activities that "would be considered prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State" if ships were engaged in those activities while "in the territorial sea")
(emphasis added).
159. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial
sea except in accordance with this Convention. In particular, in the application of this
Convention or of any laws or regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention, the
coastal State shall not:
(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or
impairing the right of innocent passage; or
(b) discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or against ships carrying
cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State.
Id.
160. Fishennen Fume, supra note 3, at Al (showing that for small fishing vessels at beginning of
fishing season additional $1100 can be significant burden).
161. See 141 CONG. REC. H10,676 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995); Vessels Paying the Fee, supra note
63.
162. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 26, para. I ("No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by
reason of their passage through the territorial sea.").
163. Id. art. 26, para. 2 ("Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through the territorial
sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship. These charges shall be levied without
discrimination.").
164. Interestingly, Raymond Chretien, the Canadian Ambassador during the fee dispute, alleged that
the fee applied to all foreign vessels. See Pamela Brogan, Gore Meets With Canadian; No Cease-Fire in
Fish War, June 23, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database. However, the official news
release from Ottawa mentioned only that U.S. commercial fishing vessels would have to pay the fee. See
Licence Fee, supra note 2, at 1. The discrimination contemplated in article 26 includes discrimination
between Canadian vessels and foreign vessels, not just discrimination among foreign vessels. In
comparison, article 25(3) is written to prohibit discrimination "among foreign ships" with regard to
security interests requiring suspension of innocent passage. There is no doubt that Canadian commercial
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However, article 21 allows restriction of innocent passage if the
regulation or law is "in respect of. . . (d) the conservation of the living
resources of the sea."165 Arguably, the fee was intended to further the
negotiation of a treaty that deals with the conservation of salmon. As any
vessel not complying with the permissible regulation was no longer engaged
in innocent passage, the enforcement of the fee would be a valid exercise of
the coastal state's sovereignty. Using this interpretation, the Canadian
boarding and forcing of U.S. boats into Canadian ports to comply with the fee
regulation would have been permissible under the UNCLOS.' 66 However,
even if the fee were a permissible regulation, the UNCLOS still requires that
the regulation apply to all foreign vessels proceeding through that section of
the territorial sea governed by the regulation. 16 7 The fee was not aimed at
all boats traversing the Inside Passage. It was only aimed at U.S. commercial
fishing boats, and as such it would not be valid under article 24.16
Another regulation that is permissible relates to the maintenance of
navigational aids. 69 Canada could make an argument that the upkeep of the
navigational aids and navigable character of the passage requires an
assessment on vessels using the passage. The UNCLOS prohibits charges for
passage unless they cover services actually provided to the vessel from the
coastal state. 7 Navigational aids and other costs associated with the upkeep
of the Inside Passage could potentially be bona fide charges. A claim that the
fee's purpose was the upkeep of navigational aids would, however, be a
flagrant abuse of that provision given the history of the fee. In addition, as
previously stated, the UNCLOS only permits charges that apply to all vessels
using the waters.17' The fee was applied only to U.S. fishing boats and,
therefore, failed to fall within any of the permissible charges that can be
levied against vessels transiting the territorial sea.
In light of the above discussion, if sections of the Inside Passage are
considered to be territorial seas, then the Canadian fee was most likely an
illegal infringement of the right of innocent passage that should have been
enjoyed by those U.S. fishing vessels that were forced to pay the fee.
fishing boats freely traversed sections of the Canadian Inside Passage in the same period that Canada
imposed the fee on U.S. commercial fishing boats, which would constitute discriminatory behavior in
violation of the GATT and UNCLOS, particularly article 26.
165. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 21, para. 1(d) (Laws and regulations of coastal State relating to
innocent passage).
166. Id. art. 25, para. 1 ("The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to
prevent passage which is not innocent.").
167. See id. art. 24, para. 1(b); see also supra note 152 and accompanying text.
168. Licence Fee, supra note 2, at 1.
169. The "safety of navigation" and the "protection of navigable aids and facilities" are considered
to be appropriate subjects of innocent passage regulation. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 21, para. 1(a)-
(b).
170. Id. art. 26, para. 2. "Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through the territorial
sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship." Id. In this case, the argument would entail
classifying the provision of navigable aids as the service provided. Interestingly, this is the article most
cited to support the U.S. proposition that the fee is prohibited under UNCLOS.
171. Id. ("These charges shall be levied without discrimination.").
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d. The Inside Passage as an International Strait
International straits connect different parts of the high seas or exclusive
economic zones and are generally available to the world's maritime vessels
for unhampered transit.'72 Because the Inside Passage consists of many
separate straits and channels flowing between islands, it is possible to describe
large sections of the Inside Passage collectively as an international strait.
Those sections could be governed by the UNCLOS international straits
regime. The Inside Passage connects one section of the territorial sea of
the United States with a separate section of the territorial sea of the United
States. It does not appear that the UNCLOS requires the two sections of
exclusive economic zoning to be in different countries.' 74 Thus, it is possible
to characterize the Inside Passage as an international strait and, hence, to
apply the rules governing transit through international straits to the Canadian
fee.
International straits impose even more restrictions on the sovereignty of
the coastal state than do territorial seas. The UNCLOS provides that
international straits, unlike territorial seas, are not only limited by an innocent
passage right but also by a transit passage right.'" The coastal state,
therefore, has diminished regulatory powers over vessels traversing the strait.
Unlike innocent passage in territorial seas, the state along an international
strait can not enforce marine conservation laws to the detriment of a transit
right.76 Thus, if the Inside Passage is defined as an international strait, then
the power of Canada to regulate its transit would be considerably diminished.
However, the UNCLOS section governing international straits does not
apply to straits where there is an alternative sea route of "similar
convenience.""7 Similar convenience requires both "navigational" and
"hydrographic" similarity.' The Inside Passage is not the only marine
route available for passage from the Northwest to Alaska. Between Alaska and
the Northwest there is an alternative high seas route located to the north and
west of Vancouver Island. Arguably, the open seas route is less hazardous and
172. See id. art. 38; see also Corfii Channel (U.K. v. AIb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (holding that innocent
passage of British vessels through Corfu Channel was right recognized by international law).
173. The sections of the Inside Passage to which I am referring are the Strait of Georgia and Queen
Charlotte Strait. The Canadians required U.S. commercial fishing boats to pay the transit fee to traverse
these straits.
174. This issue could be moot in that the Canadian Inside Passage connected the United States with
Russian Alaska; in other words, it has historically been an international strait. Alternatively, the mere fact
that more than one state relies on the passage makes it, by definition, an international strait as opposed
to a domestic strait.
175. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 42, para. 2 ("Such laws and regulations shall not.., in their
application have the practical effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the right of transit passage.").
176. Compare id. art. 42, para. 1 (listing types of regulations permitted for straits) with id. art. 21,
para. 1 (discussing territorial seas and innocent passage).
177. Id. art. 38, para. 1. This section reads:
[I]f the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit
passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or
through the exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and
hydrographic characteristics.
Id.; see also id. art. 36; id. art. 45, para. 1 (regarding innocent passage).
178. Id. art. 38, para. 1.
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complex than the Inside Passage route since it avoids many of the complex
navigational hazards that ships encounter in the Inside Passage. If a vessel
taking the open seas route to Alaska merely sets its autopilot, it will
eventually arrive in Alaskan waters without ever entering Canadian territorial
seas. However, despite such arguments, this route is more dangerous. The
high seas route can cause delays due to weather and can expose a boat and its
crew to severe and life threatening storms.179 Under the convenience test,
the high seas route would not relieve the Inside Passage from the restrictions
applied to international straits.
This "similarity" test also.requires that the hydrography of the alternate
route be similarly convenient. Hydrography, by definition, includes tides,
currents, and winds.' ° For vessels that are as small as the U.S. salmon
fishing boats, the winds and corresponding swell encountered on the seaward
side of the British Columbia islands would be considerably different than those
encountered in the Inside Passage. Hence, the seaward route is probably not
"similarly convenient" to the Inside Passage to Alaska."' The Canadian fee
would probably be invalid under the UNCLOS international straits regime.
e. Miscellaneous UNCLOS Obligations
The UNCLOS also calls on states to carry out the UNCLOS obligations
"in good faith . . . and in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of
right."1"2 If Minister Tobin used the fee merely as a means of forcing the
United States back to the bargaining table, even though he knew that the fee
was in clear violation of the UNCLOS, then his action violated this provision.
Canada may attempt to invoke article 66, concerning anadromous fish, in
order to support a claim that the fee is valid under the UNCLOS. Article 66
requires cooperation on conservation measures between all states through
which anadromous species migrate.8 3 The United States' actions prior to the
assessment of the fee could be characterized as noncooperation in violation of
this article. However, article 66 is an affirmative obligation that does not
179. See Swardson, supra note 46, at A42 ("The State Department said that the fees could 'endanger
the lives of U.S. fishermen by forcing them to traverse the more dangerous open seas.'"); see also Klass,
supra note 56, at Al (describing fisherman's decision not to risk open ocean passage because his children
were on board).
180. 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1356 (defining hydrography
as "winds, tides, currents and the like").
181. Still, other questions do come to mind. Does the similarity have to apply to all vessels? It is
doubtful that small boats, such as coracles, would ever be able to use a seaward route even in an area of
prevailing calms. Similarly, the definition of hydrography could be debated. Does it have to take into
account consistently inclement weather even if the winds and current would otherwise be favorable?
182. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 300.
183. Id. art. 66, para. 4.
In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landward of the outer
limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of origin, such State shall
co-operate with the State of origin with regard to the conservation and management of such
stocks.
Id. Furthermore, article 66(i) provides that the state of origin of anadromous fish "shall have the primary
interest in and responsibility for such stocks." Id. art. 66, para. 1. Article 66(2) then goes on to say that
the state of origin may "establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in its rivers." Id. art. 66,
para. 2. For more on how this provision relates to the dispute, see McDorman, supra note 23, at 480-87.
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provide sanctions for its breach. States are meant to use the dispute resolution
methods of the UNCLOS to deal with a state's breach of article 66. The
UNCLOS provides for peaceful dispute resolution, not the unilateral use of
a transit fee that itself violates many UNCLOS provisions.' The unilateral
imposition of a fee, enforced at gunpoint, would not be ordinarily considered
a peaceful method of enforcing a provision of the convention.
Even though there are one or two provisions of the UNCLOS that
might be construed to support the Canadian action, the fee as a whole appears
to violate Canada's UNCLOS obligations and the United States' UNCLOS
rights.
2. The Fee and Other Treaty Obligations
a. GATI and NAFTA
When criticizing the fee, the State Department also suggested that the fee
violated Canada's transit and nondiscrimination obligations under the GATT
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).8 5 Although the
State Department and the Congress explicitly cited articles of the UNCLOS,
they were more vague with regard to Canada's breach of these other treaty
obligations. As will be shown below, this is no doubt because the GATT, and
more particularly the NAFTA, are not really applicable to this dispute.
However, since the United States accused Canada of breaching these
important treaties, this Article will briefly examine the relevance of these
treaties.
Both Canada and the United States are parties to the GATT and the
NAFTA. Article V of the GATT places upon contracting parties the
obligation to provide "freedom of transit" through their own respective
territory for vessels going to or from the territory of another contracting
party."8 6 Article V requires that the transit be the "most convenient for
international transit.""8 7 For the small U.S. fishing boats, the most
convenient route for transit between Washington and southeast Alaska is
through the Canadian Inside Passage. Furthermore, article V does not allow
any transit charges except those related to the cost of the transit itself.18 8
184. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 279 ("State parties to this convention shall settle any dispute
between them ... by peaceful means."). Furthermore, there are numerous articles detailing the various
dispute mechanisms and procedures available to parties with disputes under the convention (articles 279
to 299). However, there is a possibility that the United States might not be bound by the UNCLOS dispute
provisions. For a discussion of Canada's use of the United States' breach of article 66 as a material
breach, allowing Canadian suspension of part of the UNCLOS under the Vienna Convention, see infra Part
llI.A.2.b (arguing that United States' breach would not relieve Canada of its GATT and UNCLOS
obligations).
185. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 25, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
186. GATT, supra note 5, art. V, para. 2 ("There shall be freedom of transit through the territory
of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to
or from the territory of other contracting parties.").
187. Id.
188. Id. art. V, para. 3 ("[Sluch traffic... shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or
restrictions and shall be exempt from ... all transit duties or other charges imposed in respect of transit,
except charges ... commensurate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of
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Nor under the GATT can a contracting party discriminate with respect to this
transit right. 8 9  Hence, it appears that the Canadian fee was an
impermissible obstruction of the U.S. fishing boats' GATT freedom of transit
right.
This appearance of impermissible obstruction is strengthened by reference
to the general commitment in the NAFTA to support GATT obligations.
b. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codified international
customary law regarding interpretation and application of international
treaties. The Vienna Convention provides that treaties be interpreted in good
faith and according to their intended and ordinary meaning. 90 Some of the
more farfetched interpretations mentioned in the preceding pages, such as
implying that the fee is a bona fide marine conservation regulation, would
violate the Vienna Convention. Thus, Canada should be held to the plain
meaning of the UNCLOS.
The Vienna Convention also deals with those occasions when states can
suspend their treaty obligations. The convention allows a state to terminate or
suspend a treaty when another party to that treaty materially breaches the
treaty.9' The fee could be described as the suspension of Canada's
UNCLOS and GATT obligations with respect to the United States. However,
in order for the Canadian suspension to qualify under the Vienna Convention,
the United States must have materially breached those treaties.' 92 The
Vienna Convention states that, for the purpose of suspending a treaty, a
material breach requires either repudiation of the treaty or violation of a
provision essential to the treaty.' 93 Neither the United States' behavior
services rendered.").
189. Id. art. V, para. 2 ("No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the
place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership
of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport.").
190. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, para. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose."). The United States signed on April 24, 1970, but has yet to ratify the treaty. Canada signed
on May 23, 1969 and ratified on October 14, 1970. However, the Vienna Convention is considered
customary international law. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, International Agreements (Part III), introductory note at 145 (1986).
191. Vienna Convention, supra note 191, art. 60:
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the
breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(b) A party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending
the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting
state.
192. The United States would conceivably have had to breach both treaties, or Canada would still
be bound under the nonbreached treaty since both treaties guarantee transit rights through the Inside
Passage. But see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing countermeasures and breach of treaties).
193. Vienna Convention, supra note 190, art. 60.
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in:
(a) A repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
1996]
382 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 349
during the negotiations with Canada nor U.S. fishing for salmon would have
constituted behavior in breach of the UNCLOS and the GATT that would
prevent the accomplishment of the purposes or objectives of those treaties.
B. Countermeasures and the Transit Fee
Having determined that the fee was most likely a breach of Canada's
UNCLOS and GATT obligations, we are left searching the corpus of
international law for a doctrine that could justify Canada's behavior. The
doctrine of countermeasures provides a tool that may legitimate Canada's
apparently illegal behavior in this international dispute.
International disputes between states take place within a context very
different from domestic disputes. Two parties to a domestic dispute can go to
court and receive a binding and enforced judgment that will resolve the
dispute. In the international arena, there is very little binding and compulsory
jurisdiction. International law is largely built on reciprocity and consent.
Historically, states could have resorted to gunboat diplomacy, that is, the use
of force to intimidate a weaker state into making concessions to the stronger
state. Today, gunboat diplomacy is looked on with great disfavor.
Occasionally, it is possible for a dispute to be resolved in one of the
international dispute resolution bodies or in the domestic courts of one of the
states.'9 4 Failing these approaches, states are left to their own devices to
resolve a dispute. At that point, states will frequently resort to justified self
help in the form of nonforcible countermeasures. Over the past few decades,
these countermeasures have come under close scrutiny within the international
legal community. Norms have been generated governing the use of
countermeasures during international disputes. Under some circumstances,
otherwise prohibited state action is transformed into a legitimate
countermeasure.
The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility attempts to define countermeasures:
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an obligation of that State
towards another State is precluded if the act constitutes a measure legitimate under
international law against that other State, in consequence of an internationally wrongful act
of that other State.'"
In other words "[a]ny state injured by an internationally wrongful act is
entitled in principle not to comply with its legal obligations toward the
purpose of the treaty.
Id.
194. In fact it has been claimed that the largest amount of international law is enforced in domestic
courts. However, rarely will this entail a domestic court enforcement of an international law obligation
against a foreign state. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Using Trade to Enforce International Environmental
Law: Implications for United States Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL STUD. 273, 279 (1994). Interestingly, this
dispute has had significant domestic court involvement, as described in the text.
195. Report of the Convnission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 32nd Session, [19881 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 33, U.N. Doe. A/35110.
Countermeasures in the Salmon Dispute
wrongdoing state. "196
Many international jurists have attempted to determine the necessary
conditions for an otherwise illegal unilateral state action to be considered a
legitimate countermeasure. However, the doctrine is still evolving. There is
considerable uncertainty and disagreement within the international legal
community despite the careful attention given to this field by the International
Law Commission (ILC) in its studies of state responsibility. " This body of
international law experts has been unable to codify or even agree on the
contours of countermeasure jurisprudence.19 However, the requirements
that have been largely accepted are as follows:
a. There must be a violation of an international obligation causing injury to a state (or
at least a good faith belief to that effect by the allegedly injured state).
b. A countermeasure cannot be taken until the injured state has demanded cessation
of the wrong and redress for the injury.
c. The countermeasure must be directed to ending the violation and obtaining redress
for the wrong and not to an outcome extraneous to the violation.
d. The countermeasure must not be disproportionate to the violation and the injury
suffered.
e. The countermeasure must not involve the use or threat of force contrary to the UN
Charter.
f. The countermeasure must not violate international law obligations for the protection
of fundamental human rights or peremptory norms of international law.1"
This Article will examine the Canadian transit fee to determine whether it
satisfies the above conditions and, hence, can be regarded as a legitimate
countermeasure.
1. Prior Breach as a Necessary Condition
Some jurists believe that countermeasures are legitimate only where there
has been a prior breach by one state of an obligation to another state.'1E
There are jurists who would even allow a countermeasure to be legitimate
where the state only believed that the other state had breached its obligations,
even if the other state had not in fact done so.
20'
196. Oscar Schachter, Dispute Settlement and Countermeasures in the International Law Comnission,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 471, 471 (1994).
197. The ILC consists of experts in international law, nominated by their governments (though
serving in their own personal capacity) but elected by the General Assembly. Statute of the International
Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(ID, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 105, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947). For more
on the commission, see HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 3-28 (1964). For
a good, concise discussion of the ILC's early work on countermeasures, see Peter Malanczuk,
Countermeasures and Self-Defence as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE
RESPONSIBILrrY 197 (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987).
198. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1994) ("[Ihe major
traditional subjects of customary law have been 'codified' except for state responsibility."). State
responsibility has been reduced to a number of definite ILC draft articles that are widely referred to and
respected in the international legal community. Id. at 5.
199. Schachter, supra note 196, at 472 n.8.
200. ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 48; see also Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, Tennination and Suspension
of Treaties for Breach in the ILC Works on State Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF
STATE RESPONSIBILTY, supra note 197, at 57, 59-60.
201. ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 49.
1996]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21: 349
Canada could claim that the United States breached its obligations under
the Pacific Salmon Treaty (primarily article III) and its UNCLOS article 66
obligations." 2 The damage resulting from that breach was both economic
and environmental. In addition, some jurists consider that a state can use
countermeasures to enforce "customary environmental law. " The behavior
of the United States regarding the Pacific salmon could be in breach of such
laws. Canada could argue that the imminent demise of the Pacific salmon
fisheries forced them to engage in a countermeasure pursuant to customary
environmental law.
Canada could also claim that the United States' negotiating stance
constituted a breach for the purposes of countermeasures. The tribunal in the
seminal Air Services Agreement Case asserted that "the Arbitral Tribunal does
not believe that it is possible, in the present state of international relations, to
lay down a rule prohibiting the use of countermeasures during
negotiations."2" This view of countermeasures also applies when one side
fails to negotiate in good faith. The argument follows from the premise that
countermeasures are only to be used by states upon necessity, which "is
proven when good faith negotiation has proven fruitless. At that point
countermeasures can no longer be 'avoided.'" 2 5 In this instance, the failure
to negotiate in good faith is the breach or wrongful behavior allowing the
victim state to engage in countermeasures.
Certainly, Canada can claim that when it imposed the fee, the United
States had breached its duty to negotiate in good faith. In fact, the quid pro
quo of the fee's removal was that the United States promised to return to the
negotiating table and negotiate in good faith.2"e In short, the combination of
the United States' Pacific Salmon Treaty breach, possible UNCLOS article 66
breach, environmental customary law breach, and its failure to negotiate in
good faith created the conditions allowing Canada legitimately to apply a
countermeasure against the United States.
2. Prior Demand for Redress as a Necessary Condition
In general, the idea behind countermeasures is to force the parties to
overcome an impasse between two parties. It therefore makes sense to require
that there first be a demand that the impasse be resolved before one side can
202. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note I, art. Ill.
(1) With respect to stocks subject to this Treaty, each Party shall conduct its fisheries
and its salmon enhancement programs so as to:
(a) prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production; and
(b) provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of
salmon originating in its waters.
Id.
203. O'Connell, supra note 194, at 289.
204. Air Services Agreement of March 27, 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 54 I.L.R. 304, para. 91 (1978) (Arb.
Trib. established by Compromise of July 11, 1978).
205. O'Connell, supra note 194, at 289. However, there is support for the view that countermeasures
need no prior notification where there is no duty to negotiate or resort to dispute settlement. See, e.g.,
ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 119-20.
206. Truehart, supra note 9, at A29.
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resort to the more extreme use of a countermeasure. 20 7 Countermeasures
must be preceded by a demand from the aggrieved state to the offending state
to rectify its behavior."' Reprisals are illegal unless preceded by a request
for redress .209 Canada continually and consistently demanded that the United
States resolve its own internal differences and negotiate in good faith to solve
the Pacific salmon crisis before it became too late to save the salmon fishery
from disaster, thereby satisfying the redress demand requirement.
3. "Narrow in Scope" as a Necessary Condition
Countermeasures must be directly aimed at resolving the wrongful state's
breach. In the Inside Passage dispute, the wrongful state's breach was most
proximately the United States' failure to negotiate a new Pacific Salmon
Treaty in good faith. The issue under a "narrow in scope" condition is
whether the transit fee was narrowly directed to rectifying this breach. The
fee was only aimed at commercial fishing boats and was otherwise minimally
disruptive. Once the United States agreed to return to the negotiating table,
the fee was removed. It is hard to imagine a less severe Canadian action that
would have been more directly aimed at the U.S. negotiations. Thus, the
transit fee satisfies this condition.
4. Proportionality as a Necessary Condition
Countermeasures must be proportionate to the violated international
obligation.210 The problem with proportionality is that it can be hard to
calculate, particularly where a countermeasure is not reciprocal. 1 When
assessing proportionality, jurists frequently refer to the purpose of the
countermeasure.212 If the purpose is to achieve a speedy end to a dispute,
a countermeasure can permissibly be more severe than if its purpose is to act
as a reciprocal economic action. Additionally, in the Air Services Agreement
Case, the effects of the breach and countermeasure were taken into account
when measuring their proportionality.213
The Canadian fee was intended to force the United States back to the
negotiating table. The fee was narrowly tailored and affected those directly
involved in the particular industry subject to the dispute. While the fee could
possibly have led to a high seas tragedy for some of the smaller fishing boats
that chose the riskier open seas route to Alaska, such a tragedy never
happened. The fee merely resulted in the sacrifice of effort, time, and money
207. For more on the details of demand, see ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 64-79.
208. See id. at 65; Schachter, supra note 196, at 472 n.8.
209. ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 67.
210. See ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 34, 83.
211. Karl Zemanek, Responsibility of States: General Principles, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 362, 372 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1987).
212. ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 86.
213. Id. at 94. Similarly, dependence and reliance between the two states have also been suggested
as measuring devices when determining proportionality. For more on measuring proportionality, see id.
at 86-93. Elagab cites Congress' passage of the Sugar Act of 1948 against Cuba as an example of reliance
and dependence being used to measure proportionality. Id. at 92-93.
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by the fishers and the U.S. government. The possible benefits to the economy
and environment, if the fee saves the fisheries from further overfishing, would
easily offset these temporary costs. In sum, the Canadian transit fee was a
proportionate response to the United States' negotiating posture and behavior.
5. Nonuse or Threat of Force as a Condition
Countermeasures must not resort to the threat or use of force in violation
of the U.N. Charter. The transit fee was merely a pecuniary tool to force the
United States back to the negotiating table. Certainly, the Canadians employed
armed vessels and helicopters to enforce the fee. However, such enforcement,
especially where controlled and subject to the rule of law, does not appear to
rise to the level contemplated in this condition. Consequently, the transit fee
was a peaceful, unilateral countermeasure.
6. Ius Cogens Limitation as a Condition
Countermeasures should not violate ius cogens or other fundamental
international legal norms such as human rights.214 Impairing historically
granted transit rights does not rise to the level that could be considered a
violation of ius cogens or other fundamental rights.
7. Miscellaneous Legal Issues for Countermeasures
The Tehran Hostages Case held that, where the breach affects an existing
self-enclosed legal regime with its own dispute resolution methods, resort to
a countermeasure might not be justified."' This is because the legal regime
surrounding diplomatic immunity provides its own dispute resolution
mechanism, its own "means to counter-balance a violation of those
rules. "216 Thus, countermeasures are prohibited within that context. These
regimes include diplomatic immunities and, with relevance to this Article,
possibly the Law of the Sea.217
Some jurists have explicitly stated that a countermeasure restricting the
right of innocent passage through a territorial sea or international strait is
illegitimate because the Law of the Sea is a closed system, with built-in
dispute resolution mechanisms, in the same manner as diplomatic
immunity.218 However, that view is premised on the argument that the
UNCLOS includes its own method for resolution of such transgressions. At
the time of the dispute, the UNCLOS was not formally in force, and thus its
dispute resolution mechanisms were not operational. In addition, the United
States has not formally ratified the UNCLOS, and Canada never signed onto
214. Zemanek, supra note 211, at 371.
215. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 40 (May
24); see also Zemanek, supra note 211, at 371 (arguing that Tehran case should be read as only applying
to diplomats).
216. ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 119.
217. Id. at 114.
218. Id. at 113-16.
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the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones.
Thus, there was no common closed system to preclude the use of
countermeasures. Hence, it is incorrect to characterize the Law of the Sea
obligations between these two parties as part of a closed system that precluded
resort to countermeasures.
It has been suggested that the GATT should be considered a closed
system for the purposes of countermeasures because the GATT requires prior
consent from all parties for one state to undertake a countermeasure.1 9
GATT article XXIII(2) (nullification and impairment clause) requires that
retaliation be authorized by the contracting parties. However, the contracting
parties have frequently resorted to other provisions of the GATT, which allow
them to suspend obligations unilaterally without the approval of the other
contracting parties .22 Furthermore, the United States itself has frequently
resorted to trade sanctions as a countermeasure.2' It would thus be
anomalous for the United States to claim that the GATT precludes
countermeasures because it is a closed system. Thus, the Canadian fee
survives as a legitimate countermeasure even under a possible closed system
limitation.
Many jurists, including the ILC's most recent Special Rapporteur for
State Responsibility, believe that offended states must make use of all
available dispute procedures before countermeasures are allowed.2z
However, this "exhaustion" requirement has been the subject of much debate
within the international legal community, and arguably is not yet customary
international law.2u Whether or not such a rule is part of the accepted
requirements for a legitimate countermeasure, there is no doubt that the
repeated attempts by Canada to negotiate a resolution to the impasse caused
by the disunity within the U.S. camp satisfy such an exhaustion requirement.
Finally, the scope of a countermeasure must be limited to the wrongdoer
state and must not affect third party states.224 This requirement turns the
prohibited discriminatory application of the transit fee - that it only applied
to U.S. fishing boats - into a positive attribute of the fee. Although both the
UNCLOS and the GATT have a particularly harsh view of discriminatory
rules, discrimination is a necessary requirement in a countermeasure.
The Canadians always assumed that the fee was a legitimate action. The
U.S. fishermen claimed that the fee was illegal under international law.
However, those claims focused on the fee's violations of Canada's treaty
obligations. The United States did not focus on the fee as a countermeasure.
Given that the doctrine of countermeasures is well known, the failure of the
United States to raise any argument about the fee as an illegitimate
countermeasure is significant. Aside from the fact that the United States has
219. ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 119. But see O'Connell, supra note 194, at 288 (stating that GATT
should not be considered closed system).
220. ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 119; O'Connell, supra note 194, at 288.
221. O'Connell, supra note 194, at 281. The United States is the primary user of countermeasures.
222. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifih Session, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/48110 (1993); see id. paras. 202-282.
223. See Schachter, supra note 196.
224. Zemanek, supra note 211, at 371.
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been involved in almost all the significant countermeasure cases - the Air
Services and the Iran Hostages cases, to name just two - countermeasures
are explicitly discussed in detail in the American Law Institute's Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law.2 If the United States was going to claim that the
fee was not a legitimate countermeasure, such an argument should and would
have been made early in the dispute when the fee was still a contentious
action.
Thus, under the emerging doctrine of legitimate countermeasures, the
Canadian fee was a legal state act. Canada could properly suspend its
UNCLOS and GATT obligations with respect to U.S. commercial fishing
boats' passage through the Canadian Inside Passage.
C. Unilateral State Actions and the Fee
Determining that the Canadian transit fee is a legitimate state action can
provide other similarly situated states with an example to follow in their
disputes. However, those states must first determine whether their dispute and
chosen unilateral action are in fact similar to the Canadian transit fee. Thus,
the Canadian transit fee must be further characterized and placed within the
familiar context of common unilateral state actions and remedies in
international relations.
Unilateral state actions can assume different forms and attempt to achieve
different goals. They can take the form of retorsion, suspension or termination
of treaties, and reprisals. The purpose of these unilateral actions is to receive
reparation or reciprocity. These actions are sometimes undertaken before
another state has acted in order to coerce the other state into either not acting
or acting differently. At the extreme, a state undertakes these actions to punish
the other state for its actions. Below, I will provide a brief description of the
common unilateral state actions and their intended effects.
Retorsion .is "an unfriendly but nevertheless lawful act by the aggrieved
party against the wrongdoer. "226 However, some retortive acts that would
otherwise be legal could be precluded by treaty obligations.'2 7 Unless a
treaty requires "friendly" behavior, unfriendly behavior such as severance of
diplomatic relations is not illegal.22 "[I]n a treaty relationship between
parties, suspension and termination involve, respectively, temporary or final
withdrawal, either of the violated norm as such, or of the legal instrument
embodying the norm in whole or in part."29 Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties allows suspension or termination of a
treaty for a material breach."
Finally, reprisals are a "right for the wronged state not to perform a rule
225. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 905 (1986). This section provides a great deal of detail both in the Comment and in the Reporters'
Notes.
226. ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 5.
227. ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 4.
228. Zemanek, supra note 211, at 370-71.
229. ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 27.
230. However, the Vienna Convention does not rule out a suspension or termination pursuant to a
legitimate countermeasure. See Mazzeschi, supra note 200, at 59-60.
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of international law in dealings between itself and the wrongdoer.""'
Historically, reprisals have meant armed reprisals. 2  Today, the
international community frowns on armed reprisals, which are illegal under
article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 3 Aside from armed reprisals, in the
typical modern reprisal, one state does not perform an international obligation,
though does not mean that the state contests the legal nature of the underlying
obligation. In this way, it is different from suspension or termination of a
treaty, which can be legally authorized under international law. Unlike
reciprocity, which also does not bear on the underlying legal obligations, there
is no requirement of equivalence of action. Thus, a state that engages in a
reprisal will suspend a different rule than that which is the subject of the
initial wrongdoing of the other party.
The goal of these unilateral actions is reciprocity and reparation.
Reciprocity "may be defined as acting the same way or doing the same thing
as another party. . . . [R]eciprocity involves an act of the same nature as and
similar to the original act. " ' "Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. ""
Reparation is often the intended consequence of many of the unilateral actions
described above. Coercion exists where one party attempts to bring pressure,
often through one of the actions described above, to make the other party
change its behavior. Coercive actions are temporary in that they will be
terminated if the other party changes its behavior. 6 Punishment, as a
purpose of unilateral action, is "the infliction of harm upon the
wrongdoer. . . . Punishment is a chastisement. . . [or] a satisfaction, a
revenge. "237
Because the fee was legal, it can then be classified as an example of
retorsion - "an unfriendly but. . . legal act."" In addition, the fee could
be described as a legal reprisal - the suspension of an otherwise legal
obligation, in this case the obligation to afford unobstructed innocent passage
to U.S. commercial fishing boats. The purpose of the fee, whether legal or
not, was clearly coercion: an attempt to persuade another party to change its
behavior. In this case, the Canadians attempted to persuade the United States
to return to serious negotiations to resolve the problems with the Pacific
Salmon Treaty. The fee also contained an element of punishment, since it
resulted in a kind of penalty for northwest fishers. Furthermore, it must have
231. ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 35-36. This definition can be traced to the Naulilaa case. See id. at
41.
232. For a history of the doctrine of reprisals, see ELAGAB, supra note 6, at 6-36.
233. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
234. ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 14-15. For example, Israeli army shelling of enemy positions in
retaliation for missile attacks on Israeli settlements is an act of reciprocity.
235. Factory at Chorz6w (G.D.R. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
236. ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 51-54.
237. Id. at 55. However, regarding punishment, there are some who feel that punishment does not
properly belong to the world of international countermeasures because it conflicts with the concept of state
sovereignty. See Zemanek, supra note 211, at 370.
238. ZOLLER, supra note 6, at 5.
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provided a sense of revenge and satisfaction for those Canadians harmed by
U.S. overfishing." 9
In comparison, when we characterize the United State' responses to the
fee, we see that its responses can be characterized as the traditional unilateral
state actions. The congressional response, the amendment to the FPA, was
intended by Congress to coerce Canada into not reinstating the fee. The
legislative history concerning the proposed amendment explicitly asserts that
the amendment to the FPA should be seen by Canada as a signal not to
engage in such action again. Congressman Dicks said that even though the
"Canadians recently agreed to drop the transit fee.., the language of this
legislation must remain in order to ensure that our fishermen are never again
held hostage in this kind of fashion."24° While parts of the congressional
amendment are coercive, other parts generate reciprocal actions against an
offending state. Where U.S. fishing vessels are subject to an illegal fee, the
amendment calls on the President to "impose similar conditions on the
operation or transit" of the offending state's fishing vessels.241 Such a
restriction of transit in U.S. waters would be-a suspension of U.S. UNCLOS
and GATT treaty obligations (most likely a temporary suspension while the
wrongful fee is in force). Thus, the amendment to the FPA would result in a
suspension of treaty obligations so as to act in a reciprocal manner to an
offending state. However, the amendment itself, even though never used, was
coercive in that it intended to stop Canada's and other states' actions merely
by threatening a response to an offending state if that state's conduct fell
within the amendment's domain.
,Thus, we can characterize the fee as a reprisal (the suspension of
Canada's UNCLOS and GATT obligations in the Canadian Inside Passage)
or as a legitimate suspension of a Canadian obligation (to allow innocent
passage to U.S. fishing boats), while the aggressive fishing discussed earlier
in this Article ends up looking like a "tit for tat" punishment of the United
States that was intended to be reparation for previous years' inequities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the fee satisfies the generally accepted conditions for
countermeasures, including breach of duty by an offending state, prior request
for resolution, proportionality of response, and ius cogens conformity, the fee
239. Following the breakdown of the July 1994 negotiations, the Canadians engaged in an aggressive
fishing policy. That policy, given the Canadian perception of U.S. behavior, could be classified as a
classic example of reciprocity - "an act of the same nature as and similar to the original act." Id. If U.S.
fishermen were going to catch Canadian fish without regard to Canada's concerns, the Canadians would
engage in equivalent behavior and catch U.S. fish without regard to the United States' concerns. In some
measure, this overfishing was also an example of reparation. If U.S. overfishing was a violation of the
Pacific Salmon Treaty, then Canada's aggressive fishing policy would "as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed
if that act had not been committed." Factory at Chorz6w (G.D.R. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
17, at 47 (Sept. 13). At least as far as equity was concerned, the Canadians thought that this aggressive
fishing would wipe out the effect of the U.S. catch of Canadian origin salmon. Unfortunately, the long
term consequences could quite possibly be disastrous for both countries.
240. 140 CONG. REC. H5476-77 (daily ed. July 12, 1994).
241. Fisheries Act of 1995, § 402(b).
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can join the ranks of legitimate countermeasures. Having survived at least this
examination of its legality, the fee will provide a precedent for other states
wishing to use transit fees as countermeasures. Countermeasures are a product
of customary international law. Because the contours of the law are
determined by a slow accretion of accepted state behavior, it is especially
important to determine the Canadian fee's contribution to an understanding of
what these uncertain and contested conditions are.
The first issue that the fee as a countermeasure can help to resolve is the
requisite characterization of a state's action as punitive or retortive. The
Canadian fee was coercive, punitive, and revengeful, but it still qualifies as
a legitimate state action because it conforms to established principles of
legitimacy. The characterization of the fee should not affect the action's
legitimacy under a countermeasure doctrine.
Another recent area of heated debate concerns whether a state needs to
exhaust all legal remedies before it can resort to a countermeasure or first
merely needs to request a resolution. 42 The fact that neither the United
States nor Canada has required such exhaustion demonstrates these countries'
attitudes to an exhaustion requirement. This lends validity to the argument that
the exhaustion of all remedies need not precede legitimate countermeasures.
This dispute also provides precedent in the debate concerning what sort
of breach of obligations is required before an injured state can resort to a
countermeasure. It is arguable that the breach in this dispute was the United
States' breach of its good faith duty to negotiate. More radically, it could be
argued that the breach by the United States was a breach of emerging
international environmental law. Thus, these nontraditional breaches can also
result in a legitimate countermeasure.
Besides fleshing out the contours of the law of countermeasures, the
Inside Passage fee illustrates that the use of countermeasures as a tool in
resolving a dispute has several advantages. Disputes between states can be
resolved through international mediation, but such mediation can be time
consuming. Where environmental issues are involved, every delay makes the
underlying issue harder to resolve successfully. In this case, by 1994, it was
evident that prompt action by the states involved in Pacific salmon fishing was
necessary to avoid an ecological disaster. The Canadian fee was absolutely
necessary to convince the United States that the dispute needed to be resolved
before it was too late. The international legal system, through the doctrine of
countermeasures, legitimates necessary and immediate state actions that, but
for this urgency, could have been resolved in an international tribunal.
Another advantage gleaned from the example of Canada's countermeasure
against the United States is that countermeasures may provide an important
tool for weaker states engaged in bilateral disputes. In this dispute, the United
States had vastly more leverage and power than Canada as a result of the
particular migratory habits of the Pacific salmon. The United States, as
represented by Alaska, could comfortably maintain the status quo, but
Canada's fisheries would slowly become nonviable. Thus, concerning the
substance and timetable for the negotiations, the United States had the upper
242. See Schachter, supra note 196, at 475.
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hand. Canada's resort to a countermeasure, the transit fee, was instrumental
in breaking the deadlock in negotiations for a new Pacific Salmon Treaty,
even though it did not resolve the underlying dispute.
Independently, countermeasures rarely resolve disputes, but they are not
without effect. The effect of the countermeasure was to force the United
States back to the negotiating table and to generate public pressure within the
United States to force the United States to negotiate a resolution. The fee
served to inform the United States that Canada was prepared to take tough
actions, so called "un-Canadian" actions, in order to achieve a solution to the
salmon crisis. Canada's resort to a peaceful countermeasure, as opposed to
more aggressive and destructive methods of evening the playing field,
provides a useful and peaceful example to other weaker states in similar
negotiations.
The successful use of a countermeasure in this dispute raises the issue of
whether such countermeasures are deleterious to the international legal order.
Through the use of this countermeasure, parts of Canada's UNCLOS, GATT,
and other treaty obligations were suspended through the use of this
countermeasure. One may argue that resorting to countermeasures to
legitimate otherwise illegal state action can effectively undermine state respect
for international law. However, in this case, Canada's transit fee will not only
prove to be beneficial for the United States, Canada, and the Pacific salmon,
it also creates a minimal dislocation of international law - the temporary
suspension of innocent passage. If, as here, countermeasures are treated as an
international form of "justification," subject to good faith and proportionate
application, then we should not fear that the use of countermeasures will lead
to an erosion of the international legal order. For one thing, the benefits to the
countries outweigh the harm to the international rule of law. Second, weaker
states will be able to negotiate fairly with stronger states through the use of
countermeasures. By providing a safety valve equivalent to the justification
and necessity doctrine in domestic law, states will explore peaceful unilateral
remedies in disputes with other states before resorting to forceful measures.
All this serves not to erode international law but to strengthen it.
In conclusion, the 1994 Canadian Inside Passage transit fee violated
Canada's UNCLOS and GATT obligations. The fact that Canada "got away"
with the fee illustrates the acceptability of such countermeasures in
circumstances where a bilateral environmental treaty negotiation has reached
an impasse. The otherwise illegal fee was a justified departure from the
confines of Canada's international treaty obligations. This Article has dealt
with the particular circumstances surrounding the 1994 fee. The recent call in
Canada to reintroduce the fee for the 1996 salmon season could present
completely different problems to legitimacy under countermeasure
jurisprudence. Consequently, this Article's conclusion that the 1994 free was
a legitimate countermeasure is not a blanket validation of future Canadian
Inside Passage transit fees. The 1994 fee will help the analysis of the
threatened 1996 fee, if it joins the examples of countermeasures available for
guidance and precedent. However, the Canadian Inside Passage fee has not
yet received the attention that will allow it to contribute to the accretion of
customary international law. Hopefully, this Article will stimulate that
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attention, and by providing the international legal community with one more
example of an acceptable countermeasure, it will enrich the discussion of this
emerging international law doctrine.

